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Dynamic Forest Federalism 
Blake Hudson∗ 
Abstract 
State and local governments have long maintained regulatory 
authority to manage natural resources, and most subnational 
governments have politically exercised that authority to some 
degree. Policy makers, however, have increasingly recognized that 
the dynamic attributes of natural resources make them difficult to 
manage on any one scale of government. As a result, the nation 
has shifted toward multilevel governance known as “dynamic 
federalism” for many if not most regulatory subject areas, 
especially in the context of the natural environment. The nation 
has done so both legally and politically—the constitutional 
validity of expanded federal regulatory authority over resources 
has consistently been upheld by courts in recent decades, and 
federal, state, and local governments have been increasingly 
politically engaged in addressing environmental harms. Yet, 
remnants of “dual federalism”—which conceives of 
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constitutionally protected, separate spheres of governance as 
between the federal and state governments—impact the 
governance of certain resources, like subnational forests. The 
preservation of the nation’s forests, in turn, is critical to 
environmental well-being in the coming decades, especially when 
considering the crucial role of forests in combating climate 
change. The entrenchment of legal and political dualism in the 
forest context stymies federal inputs into subnational forest 
management at a time when state and local governments are 
unlikely, given current trends, to curb the destruction of a 
significant acreage of the nation’s forests over the next fifty years. 
This Article, first, uses forest resources as a case study to shed 
light on the broader constitutional debate regarding dual versus 
dynamic regulatory approaches in the United States. Second, the 
Article is the first to thoroughly detail the under-analyzed status 
of subnational forest management regulation on the dual-dynamic 
federalism spectrum and the first to make a normative argument 
that U.S. forest policy should become more dynamic to avoid the 
unmitigated destruction of resources of increasing value to the 
nation, and indeed the globe, in a time of climate change. 
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I. Introduction 
Our world is composed of dynamic natural resources.1 In the 
natural environment forests burn, rivers flood, sea levels rise, 
and climate changes. Yet human influence adds an extra, and 
potentially more potent, layer of dynamism on top of these 
already dynamic natural processes. Just consider that by 1920 
humans had reduced U.S. forest cover by nearly half,2 and over 
 1. Portions of this Article formed foundational research for Chapter 5 of 
the author’s book, published in 2014. See BLAKE HUDSON, CONSTITUTIONS AND 
THE COMMONS: THE IMPACT OF FEDERAL GOVERNANCE ON LOCAL, NATIONAL, AND 
GLOBAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT (2014). 
 2. Forest cover by 1920 had been reduced by 43%, though forest resources 
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the last century development has claimed over half of all 
wetlands in North America.3 Humans have extracted, consumed, 
and released millions of years’ worth of stored carbon during the 
last century and a half alone,4 thereby altering natural 
background processes of climate change, sea level rise, and 
associated disaster events such as hurricane-induced flooding. If 
we have observed one thing from human interaction with 
dynamic resources, it is that our ability to adaptively and 
effectively manage those resources is often quite undynamic in its 
own right. Society often fails to harness effective tools of 
environmental law and policy until scarcity, disaster, or other 
resource management challenges arise. One only has to look to 
polluted rivers catching on fire in the 1970’s, the ever-so-slowly 
recovering ozone layer, the widespread destruction of flood 
disaster-mitigating coastal wetlands, or deforestation’s high 
contribution to annual global carbon emissions to find examples 
of human failure to proactively prevent resource crises.5 Instead 
of continuing to allow dynamic shifts in resource use and 
preservation to outpace legal and policy solutions, a key challenge 
faced by modern society is to find congruity between the shifts 
and the solutions.  
One of the ways society has sought to achieve dynamic 
responses to resource management challenges is by utilizing a 
federal system of government, whereby a nested set of local, 
state, and federal governments can each flexibly maintain inputs 
have since rebounded to cover approximately 75% of their historical baseline. 
JAMES RASBAND, JAMES SALZMAN & MARK SQUILLACE, NATURAL RESOURCES LAW 
AND POLICY 1198–1200 (2d ed. 2009). 
 3. David Moreno-Mateos et al., Structural and Functional Loss in 
Restored Wetland Ecosystems, 10 PLOS BIOLOGY 1, 1 (Jan. 2012) 
http://www.plosbiology.org/article/fetchObject.action?uri=info%3Adoi%2F10.137
1%2Fjournal.pbio.1001247&representation=PDF. 
 4. See Changes in the Carbon Cycle, NASA EARTH OBSERVATORY, 
http://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/Features/CarbonCycle/page4.php (last visited 
Sept. 24, 2014) (discussing and providing graphs on the carbon cycle changes 
that have taken place since the beginning of the Industrial Revolution) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 5. See DAVID N. WEAR & JOHN G. GREIS, U.S. FOREST SERV., THE SOUTHERN 
FOREST FUTURES PROJECT: SUMMARY REPORT 26–31, 35 (2011), 
http://www.srs.fs.usda.gov/futures/reports/draft/summary_report.pdf (discussing 
the projected effects of deforestation on the southern United States). 
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into resource management.6 Yet we often see inaction at one or 
more of these levels, effectively facilitating or exacerbating 
resource overexploitation. This inaction may result for one of two 
primary reasons—either a level of government politically refuses 
to design effective resource management inputs, or a level of 
government is legally constrained from doing so due to the 
allocation of governance authority as established by national or 
state constitutional or legislative authorities.7 Regardless of 
whether inaction is due to political or legal constraints, this 
undynamic form of federalism is increasingly unworkable for 
addressing some of the most pressing resource challenges. Such is 
the case with the resource category this Article uses as a case 
study to explore resource management challenges associated with 
undynamic federalism—U.S. forests. U.S. forests provide not only 
critical local goods and services but also play a key role in global 
climate change regulation, serving as a critical carbon sink.8 U.S. 
forests have a dynamic history, having returned to fairly stable 
levels just last century.9 Yet recent changes in forest markets and 
ownership combined with dynamic processes like urbanization, 
climate change, and species invasions are projected to place great 
strains on United States forest resources once more—with recent 
government reports forecasting a new and significant phase of 
deforestation in the southeastern United States in particular.10  
Despite new threats that U.S. forest resources may face over 
the coming decades, the legal regulatory framework for forest 
management in the U.S. is anything but dynamic and is in need 
of an overhaul. Intertwined with this institutional need is a 
needed reassessment of the political attention that all levels of 
government currently place on U.S. forest management. The U.S. 
federal government maintains direct inputs into the management 
 6. See infra Part III.A (discussing the regulatory framework implemented 
in the United States to manage forests). 
 7. See Blake Hudson & Jonathan Rosenbloom, Uncommon Approaches to 
Commons Problems: Nested Governance Commons and Climate Change, 64 
HASTINGS L.J. 1273, 1277–78 (2013) (discussing both the legal and political 
barriers that prevent collective action across local, state, and federal levels of 
government). 
 8. Infra Part III.A.1. 
 9. RASBAND ET AL., supra note 2. 
 10. See WEAR & GREIS, supra note 5 (projecting that the southern United 
States will lose between 11 and 23 million acres of its forested lands by 2060). 
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of only the 35% of forests over which it has control, and sustains 
fairly high forest management standards on those forestlands.11 
The fifty state governments and their political subdivisions are 
primarily responsible for managing the 60% of U.S. forests in 
private control and the 5% owned by state governments.12 State 
and local governments in the United States, however, are grossly 
inconsistent in their regulatory approaches to forest 
management. Many states promote—with mixed results—a 
variety of incentive-based instruments and programs to influence 
private landowner forest management, including the use of land 
use instruments (easements), fiscal incentives (cost–share 
arrangements and tax policies), liability limitations (“right to 
practice forestry” laws), market initiatives (ecolabeling, 
mitigation banking, and carbon offset programs), and increased 
education and capacity building.13 Yet, only a handful of states 
maintain substantive forest management regulatory standards.14 
 11. ARNOLDO CONTRERAS-HERMOSILLA, HANS M. GREGERSEN & ANDY WHITE, 
FORREST SYSTEMS IN COUNTRIES WITH FEDERAL SYSTEMS OF GOVERNMENT: 
LESSONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR DECENTRALIZATION 4 (2008), http://www.cifor.org/ 
publications/pdf_files/Books/BContreras-Hermosilla0701.pdf; CONSTANCE L. 
MCDERMOTT ET AL., GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL FOREST POLICIES: AN 
INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON 84 (2010). 
 12. U.N. ENV’T PROGRAMME, STATE OF THE ENVIRONMENT AND POLICY 
RETROSPECTIVE 110 (2002), http://www.unep.org/geo/GEO3/english/pdfs/ 
chapter2-3_forests.pdf. 
 13. See, e.g., N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. § 9-0815 (McKinney 2013) (requesting 
comments on local laws and ordinances dealing with the practice of forestry); 
FLORIDA RANCHLANDS ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES PROJECT (2012), 
http://www.fresp.org/ (last visited Sept. 24, 2014) (organizing a group to address 
environmental problems in south Florida) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review); RENÉE JOHNSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33898, CLIMATE 
CHANGE: THE ROLE OF THE U.S. AGRICULTURE SECTOR 21–24 (2009), (discussing 
different state and regional climate initiatives); DONALD B. PEDERSEN & KEITH 
G. MEYER, AGRICULTURAL LAW IN A NUTSHELL 369–70 (West Publishing 1995) 
(discussing the concept of agricultural districts); see also Jacob T. Cremer, 
Tractors Versus Bulldozers: Integrating Growth Management and Ecosystem 
Services to Conserve Agriculture, 39 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10541, 
10546 (2009) (discussing the efforts taken by the Florida Ranchlands 
Environmental Services project) (citing Sarah Lynch & Leonard Shabman, 
Valuing Ecosystem Services on Florida Ranchlands: Lessons Learned, from The 
Florida Ranchlands Environmental Services Project: Field Testing a Pay-for-
Environmental Services Program, 165 RESOURCES 17 (2007)). Although many of 
these programs are aimed primarily at agriculture, they include forest activities 
as well. 
 14. See, e.g., MCDERMOTT ET AL., supra note 11; OR. ADMIN. R. 
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Furthermore, even these regulations are often aimed primarily at 
the most basic and fundamental principles of industrial-scale 
timber management, and do not even begin to address the 
preservation or re-establishment of forestland that may be 
needed to mitigate the perpetual rise of atmospheric carbon 
concentrations, the habitat fragmentation that increasingly 
places biodiversity in jeopardy, and the erosion that is 
increasingly leading to the eutrophication of U.S. waters, only to 
name a few environmental problems associated with forest loss. 
Many more states maintain no forest management standards at 
all. Similarly, while a number of local governments (counties and 
municipalities) maintain forest management regulatory 
policies,15 many more do not.16  
The inconsistencies across federal, state, and local forest 
policies in the United States arise largely due to distinct political 
cultures across jurisdictions. Some inconsistencies, however, arise 
due to potential legal constraints placed on certain levels of 
government. Constitutional limitations on the federal 
government to engage in land use planning traditionally the role 
of state and local governments and preemption of local 
government forest policies by state legislative or constitutional 
mandates provide just a couple of examples.17 Regardless of 
660-015-0000(14) (discussing Oregon’s urban growth boundaries, and their role 
in protecting agricultural and forestland); Oregon Dep’t of Land Cons. & Dev., 
Rural Development in Oregon, OREGON.GOV, http://www. 
oregon.gov/LCD/pages/ruraldev.aspx#Rural_Development_in_Oregon (last visited 
Sept. 24, 2014) (discussing Oregon’s statewide program to protect farm and 
forestland) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); PEDERSEN & 
MEYER, supra note 13, at 373–77 (noting that several states create agricultural 
districts by offering certain benefits to landowners in return for covenants 
running with the land that promote agricultural preservation).  
 15. See, e.g., Washington County, Md., Forest Conservation Ordinance 
(Dec. 31, 2013) (setting out a county-wide plan for environmental preservation); 
The Maryland Forest Conservation Act, MD. CODE ANN., NAT. RES. §§ 5-1601 to 
1612 (setting out a series of forest conservation plans); Forest Conservation 
Ordinance, WASHINGTON COUNTY, MARYLAND: DEPARTMENT OF PLANNING AND 
ZONING, available at http://www.washco-md.net/planning/forest.shtm (last 
visited Sept. 24, 2014) (describing the impetus and purpose of the Washington 
County Forest Conservation Ordinance) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). 
 16. See MCDERMOTT ET AL., supra note 11, at 339–50 (describing different 
standards, and their shortcomings, at lower levels of government). 
 17. See Hudson & Rosenbloom, supra note 7, at 1279–80 (discussing some 
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whether these inconsistencies are due to political or legal factors, 
if the nation is to proactively address the grave threats to U.S. 
forests in the coming decades it will need dynamic action at all 
levels to achieve effective forest management that sustains the 
wide range of values provided by forests. To do so policy makers 
will need to overcome problems of both political will and 
questions of legal authority and will need a new form of what 
scholars have termed “dynamic federalism” to maintain a proper 
pace with dynamic resource management challenges in the 
United States. A shift toward greater dynamism in U.S. forest 
policy will be crucial to avoiding or mitigating the major threats 
to U.S. forest resources in the coming decades—threats that 
endanger not only local and national goods and services but also 
global services in the face of a changing climate.  
This Article is novel in that most legal scholarship on U.S. 
forests focuses on federal forestlands, which only constitute 35% 
of the nation’s forests. As such, this Article will provide a needed 
holistic, descriptive analysis of the state of U.S. forest policy and 
how subnational forests (state, local, or privately owned forests) 
are one of the last resources in the nation to remain almost 
exclusively in the realm of dual federalism. Beyond this 
descriptive analysis, the Article will make a normative argument 
that U.S. forest policy should be infused with greater dynamism 
to protect important domestic forest resources. The Article will do 
so through the lens of a southeastern forest case study, focusing 
on the area of the country facing the most severe threats to 
forests over the coming decades and the area that also maintains 
arguably the least dynamic forest policy in the nation.  
Part II deconstructs the different conceptions of U.S. 
federalism, distinguishing between the political and legal 
components of “dynamic” versus “dual” federalism. The Part then 
briefly details the shift toward dynamic federalism regulatory 
understandings for most resources in the United States and the 
current status quo of “bimodal federalism” whereby some 
resources remain subject to dualistic notions of constitutional 
federalism. Part III describes where along this dual-dynamic 
federalism spectrum U.S. forest policy is situated, detailing the 
constraints placed on local, state, and federal governments in implementing 
environmental or land use policies). 
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importance of forest resources to the U.S. and the forest 
regulatory framework and policy options for both federal and 
subnational governments. This Part discusses the threats to U.S. 
forests in the coming decades through the lens of a southeastern 
forest case study, which serves as a proxy for threats to United 
States forests resources on the whole. The Part next describes 
U.S. forest federalism as being dual, both legally and politically, 
and how this leads to voluntary incentive programs at the federal 
level that are insufficient to adequately coordinate state forest 
policies and address the threats to U.S. forests. The Part further 
describes the implications of U.S. forest resources currently being 
subject to dual conceptions of federalism and concludes with a 
normative call for dynamism in U.S. forest policy to avoid 
destruction of crucial forest resources. Part IV then details the 
context and history of the southeastern forest resource base, 
which almost tipped toward dynamism early in the twentieth 
century, and how similarities between the past and current 
conditions of southern forest resources support a new shift 
toward dynamism in the present day. Part V concludes by 
summarizing the foundational arguments of this Article’s 
companion piece, laying a foundation of constitutional arguments 
for federal minimum standards for subnational forests and what 
those standards would entail from a legislative perspective.  
II. Deconstructing U.S. Federalism: Political and Legal 
Dynamism Versus Dualism 
Expressed in the most simplified terms, dynamic federalism 
means that all levels of government in a federal system maintain 
legal authority to politically act within a given policy arena—
from the federal government, to state governments, to local 
governments. This legal freedom provides the greatest chance for 
effective political action to take place at the appropriate 
governmental level. Furthermore, for federalism to be truly 
dynamic, each of those governmental levels must be actively 
engaged in the political process. As discussed in greater detail 
below, both the legal authority and political action questions play 
a role in the woefully undynamic nature of U.S. forest policy. As 
such, the following parts describe what precisely legal and 
1652 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1643 (2014) 
political dynamism and dualism entail, detail the trend toward 
dynamic federalism both legally and politically in the United 
States, and describe the current status of U.S. federalism as 
being “bimodal”—that is, maintaining elements of both dynamic 
and dual federalism. 
A. Legal Dynamism Versus Dualism 
If there is one matter upon which the legal community can 
unanimously agree, it is that the U.S. Constitution establishes a 
federal system of government. The unanimity regarding U.S. 
federal constitutional structure, however, ends there. The mode 
of federalism the U.S. maintains has become the subject of great 
debate, both regarding descriptive jurisprudential claims of how 
federalism in fact operates in the United States normative claims 
of how federalism should operate. Though this debate has waged 
for some time, its relevance renews as we see dynamic shifts in 
the conservation status and recognized value of resources in the 
face of a changing climate, increasing population and 
development pressures, and changing economic drivers of supply 
and demand for natural resources. How legal authority is 
allocated among levels of government in a federal system 
determines whether regulatory solutions for resource challenges 
can be crafted at certain levels. As a result, the constitutional 
theory of federalism that prevails has important implications for 
natural resource governance.  
Some scholars and policy makers prefer to conceive of the 
United States as currently maintaining a system of “dynamic 
federalism” whereby any level of government maintains 
constitutional authority to regulate any subject matter, and in 
which there are no separate spheres of governance as between 
federal, state, and local governments. Dynamic federalism 
“rejects any conception of federalism that separates federal and 
state authority under the dualist notion that the states need a 
sphere of authority protected from the influence of the federal 
government” and posits that “federal and state governments 
function as alternative centers of power and any matter is 
presumptively within the authority of both the federal and the state 
DYNAMIC FOREST FEDERALISM 1653 
governments.”18 Others maintain a different conception of U.S. 
federalism known as “dual federalism,” positing that “the states 
and the federal government inhabit[] mutually exclusive 
spheres of power.”19 In other words, proponents of dual 
federalism argue that separate spheres of regulatory authority 
do in fact exist, and the respective federal and state 
governments (including state government subdivisions) may not 
regulate in areas constitutionally reserved for the other.  
These polar positions drive much of the judicial and 
academic wrangling over whether, for example, under the 
Commerce Clause the federal government can regulate matters 
of traditional state regulatory authority or whether state and 
local governments can regulate matters that the federal 
government claims are preempted by federal authority.20 As 
evidenced by an increase in preemptive efforts at both the 
federal21 and state22 levels and recent cases on topics ranging 
from criminal activity near schools,23 domestic violence,24 
 18. Kirsten H. Engel, Harnessing the Benefits of Dynamic Federalism in 
Environmental Law, 56 EMORY L.J. 159, 176 (2006) (emphasis added).  
 19. Id. at 175; see Jonathan H. Adler, Jurisdictional Mismatch in 
Environmental Federalism, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 130, 157 (2005) (stating that 
the normative approach to environmental regulation does not line up with the 
actual approach utilized); Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental 
Federalism, 95 MICH. L. REV. 570, 587 (1996) (arguing that environmental 
regulation can create negative externalities where the jurisdiction of the 
regulatory entity is too narrow); Richard O. Zerbe, Optimal Environmental 
Jurisdictions, 4 ECOLOGY L.Q. 193, 245 (1974) (discussing the detrimental 
effects of structural mismatches in environmental regimes); see generally Henry 
N. Butler & Jonathan R. Macey, Externalities and the Matching Principle: The 
Case for Reallocating Environmental Regulatory Authority, 14 YALE. L. & POL’Y 
REV. 23 (1996) (arguing against the centralization of environmental regulatory 
and legislative power). 
 20. See infra note 61 (discussing debates over the Commerce Clause).  
 21. See Engel, supra note 18, at 184–87 (discussing the threat that federal 
preemption poses to principles of federalism). 
 22. See generally Jonathan Rosenbloom, New Day at the Pool: State 
Preemption, Common Pool Resources, and Non-Place Based Municipal 
Collaborations, 36 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 445 (2012) (discussing the adverse 
effect that state preemption can have on local governments’ attempts to 
introduce environmental regulation). 
 23. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995) (holding that the 
Guns Free School Zones Act exceeded Congress’ power under the Commerce 
Clause). 
 24. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 601 (2000) (finding that 
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wetlands preservation,25 medical marijuana,26 and health care 
(or, “Obamacare”),27 legal debates over the constitutional 
workings of U.S. federalism continue to define a variety of 
regulatory subject areas.  
Dynamic federalism theory calls into question previously 
held duel federalism-driven assumptions that “regulatory 
authority to address environmental ills should be allocated to one 
the Commerce Clause did not give Congress the power to enact the Violence 
Against Women Act). 
 25. See Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 739 (2006) (plurality 
opinion) (defining narrowly “navigable waters” under the Clean Water Act to 
include those waters with a “significant nexus” to traditional navigable waters); 
Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cnty. v. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 174 
(2001) (construing the Clean Water Act to not include isolated wetlands that are 
a stopping point for migratory birds under the federal government’s 
jurisdictional reach). 
 26. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (holding that the provision in 
the Controlled Substances Act that banned the possession, distribution, or 
manufacture of marijuana was permissible under the Commerce Clause). 
 27. In National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 
2566 (2012), the U.S. Supreme Court gave new life to “new federalist” 
arguments that arose after Lopez and Morrison by refusing to uphold the 
Affordable Care Act under the Commerce Clause. Id. at 2585–93. Instead, the 
Court upheld the Act under the power to tax. Id. at 2593–601. Justice Roberts, 
in refusing to uphold the individual mandate portion of the Affordable Care Act 
as constitutional under the Commerce Clause, stated: 
Construing the Commerce Clause to permit Congress to regulate 
individuals precisely because they are doing nothing would open a 
new and potentially vast domain to congressional authority. Congress 
already possesses expansive power to regulate what people do. 
Upholding the Affordable Care Act under the Commerce Clause 
would give Congress the same license to regulate what people do not 
do. The Framers knew the difference between doing something and 
doing nothing. They gave Congress the power to regulate commerce, 
not to compel it. Ignoring that distinction would undermine the 
principle that the Federal Government is a government of limited and 
enumerated powers. The individual mandate thus cannot be 
sustained under Congress’s power to “regulate Commerce.” 
Id. at 2573; see also Tom Scocca, Obama Wins the Battle, Roberts Wins the War, 
SLATE.COM (June 28, 2012 11:59 AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_ 
politics/scocca/2012/06/roberts_health_care_opinion_commerce_clause_the_real_
reason_the_chief_justice_upheld_obamacare_.html (last visited Sept. 24, 2014) 
(arguing that the Sebelius decision’s narrow interpretation of the Commerce 
Clause further restricts Congress’ Commerce Clause powers) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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or the other level of government with minimal overlap.”28 
Professor Engel has argued that: 
a static allocation of authority between the state and federal 
government is inconsistent with the process of policymaking in 
our federal system, in which multiple levels of government 
interact in the regulatory process. Absent constitutional 
changes that would lock in a specific allocation of authority, 
broad, overlapping authority between levels of government 
may be essential to prompting regulatory activity at the 
preferred level of government.29 
Dynamic federalism recognizes the importance of multilevel 
allocations of regulatory authority in federal systems and 
“conceives the states and the federal government as alternative—
not mutually exclusive—sources of regulatory authority.”30 
Dynamic regulatory approaches may be practically applied by, for 
example, crafting federal legislation that allows subnational 
governments flexibility to regulate within a “standards 
framework” provided by the federal government, such that, for 
example, “where national uniformity is desired, Congress might 
allow for the development of a single standard by the states 
themselves, as opposed to the imposition of a single standard by 
the states themselves.”31 So an effective dynamic governance 
approach does not fully supplant authority at particular levels of 
government but rather creates a system of supplemental 
governance at all levels whereby the federal government may set 
a target, limit, or other regulatory goal and allows subnational 
governments either the ability to take into account local 
considerations when designing mechanisms to achieve that target 
or limit, or the flexibility to design their own regulatory 
 28. Engel, supra note 18, at 161. 
 29. Id.  
 30. Id. at 162. 
 31. Id. Given that the loss of forest carbon sequestration capabilities in the 
face of climate change is nothing more than a slow-moving disaster, dynamic 
federalism echoes disaster scholar Charles Perrow’s call for “[f]ederal and state 
governments [to] establish minimum standards, which states or localities can 
exceed.” CHARLES PERROW, THE NEXT CATASTROPHE: REDUCING OUR 
VULNERABILITIES TO NATURAL, INDUSTRIAL, AND TERRORIST DISASTERS 36 (2007). 
In other words, the goal is to establish floors rather than ceilings of 
environmental and land-use standards. Engel, supra note 18, at 185. 
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standards supplemental to federal regulations.32 The synergies 
that a dynamic approach provides “can lead either, or both, 
parties to adopt policy positions significantly different from the 
positions they would have adopted had they been regulating in a 
vacuum,”33 and “has important benefits in terms of developing 
quality, responsive regulation, and spreading regulatory 
innovations.”34 
Proponents of dual federalism, on the other hand, posit that 
maintaining distinct boundaries between federal and state 
regulatory authority in some subject areas leads to more 
responsive governance, increased governmental competition, 
innovation, participatory democracy, and a guard against the 
potential tyranny of central authority.35 The argument is that 
states are closer to their respective constituencies than is the 
federal government, can better allocate the economic resources of 
the citizenry, and should be able to do so free of federal 
interference.36 In addition, federalism may act as a 
 32. Indeed, as dynamic federalism scholars have highlighted, “overlapping 
jurisdiction may be pivotal to encouraging the more appropriate level of 
government to respond to a given problem.” Engel, supra note 18, at 177. 
 33. Id. at 171. 
 34. Id. at 173. Other scholars, such as Professor Osofsky, have promoted 
“diagonal federalism” strategies that “incorporate key public and private actors 
at different levels of government (the vertical piece) and within each level of 
government (the horizontal piece) simultaneously in order to create needed 
crosscutting interactions.” Hari M. Osofsky, Diagonal Federalism and Climate 
Change: Implications for the Obama Administration, 62 ALA. L. REV. 237, 241 
(2011). In the disaster and land-use context “[t]here is evidence of a shift in 
governmental policy towards the vertical integration of federal, state, and local 
governmental action in order to most effectively and comprehensively address 
land development in disaster prone areas as well as a host of other economic 
development and environmental problems.” John R. Nolon, Disaster Mitigation 
Through Land Use Strategies, 23 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 959, 964 (2006).  
 35. See Robert A. Schapiro, Toward a Theory of Interactive Federalism, 91 
IOWA L. REV. 243, 266 (2005) (laying out the arguments supporting dual 
federalism). 
 36. See generally DAVID L. SHAPIRO, FEDERALISM: A DIALOGUE 77–85 (1995) 
(describing issues with federalist approaches); Friedrich A. Hayek, The 
Economic Conditions of Interstate Federalism, NEW COMMONWEALTH Q, 
September 1939, at 131, reprinted in FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, INDIVIDUALISM AND 
ECONOMIC ORDER 255, 268 (1948) (discussing the efficiency related to carrying 
out economic plans on a smaller state or local scale); William W. Bratton & 
Joseph A. McCahery, The New Economics of Jurisdictional Competition: 
Devolutionary Federalism in a Second-Best World, 86 GEO. L.J. 201 (1997) 
(arguing for the economic benefit of jurisdictional competition); Barry R. 
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“constitutional antitrust principle,” preventing the federal 
government from interfering with state competition.37 Also, state 
citizens availing themselves of their own protected sphere of legal 
authority might be more likely to participate in the democratic 
process because that sphere cannot be wrenched away from the 
state citizenry by an external authority.38 Finally, dual federalist 
proponents argue that without a constitutionally protected, 
separate sphere states would be unable to prevent abuse by a 
majoritarian federal government that might disregard regional 
interests.39 
B. Political Dynamism Versus Dualism 
While the question of legal dynamism versus dualism turns 
on difficult assessments of the constitutional allocation of 
governance authority among levels of government, political 
dynamism versus dualism turns on a much less complex 
assessment. The terms “political dynamism” and “political 
dualism” are used in this Article to merely assess whether each 
level of government—assuming each maintains legal authority to 
act—is actually engaged in exercising that legal authority. Or 
whether, on the other hand, certain levels of government choose 
to leave policy making entirely to another level of government.  
Weingast, The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-Preserving 
Federalism and Economic Development, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 1, 1 (1995) 
(introducing issues caused by regulation in America and England); Jacques 
LeBoeuf, The Economics of Federalism and the Proper Scope of the Federal 
Commerce Power, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 555, 556 (1994) (arguing that federal 
regulation under the Commerce Clause is proper only where state regulation 
would be inefficient due to widespread externalities); Michael W. McConnell, 
Federalism: Evaluating the Founders’ Design, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1484, 1493–98 
(1987) (arguing against federal interference); Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory 
of Local Expenditure, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956) (arguing for an allowance of 
broad local expenditures because of the greater role individuals can play in local 
government action as opposed to the federal government). 
 37. Schapiro, supra note 35, at 267 (stating that federalism allows the 
states to compete and prevents them from entering into an agreement, via 
federal law, to act in anticompetitive ways). 
 38. Id. at 270–71 (arguing that federalism promotes republicanism and 
encourages the citizenry to vote). 
 39. Id. at 272–73 (stating that federalism protects individuals’ liberty 
interests, especially those tied to regional differences). 
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We might understand political dynamism in resource 
management as regulatory policy development at all levels of 
government to sustainably manage resources. So, for example, 
perhaps the federal government creates a minimum standards 
framework for forest management within which states maintain 
flexibility in implementation. The states might also go above the 
floor set by federal regulation and implement more stringent 
standards. The states, in turn, would allow flexibility among local 
governments to meet standards or hit targets. This approach 
allows each level of government to maintain inputs into the 
management scheme if each chooses politically to do so. Political 
dualism, on the other hand, occurs when certain levels of 
government choose not to take policy action and therefore leave 
the resource management challenge for other levels of 
government to address.  
A few clarifications should here be made. First, this Article 
uses “political action” to refer to the development of regulatory 
standards, not policy instruments that take on a less prescriptive 
form. Regarding subnational forest management, for example, 
there are a variety of voluntary or incentive based programs that 
are offered at all levels of government (through tax policy, 
subsidies, etc.). Yet, a premise of this Article is that while those 
are certainly important programs, and should be continued, 
standing alone they are simply unlikely to forestall the threats 
facing U.S. forests in the coming decades. As a result, regulatory 
action across scales and coordination among levels of government 
in enacting those policies will be crucial. So this Article does not 
conceive of federal subsidies provided to forest owners to plant 
trees coupled with voluntary state forest “best management 
practices” to be politically dynamic. Rather, regulatory policies at 
each level that work together to conserve and preserve forest 
resources through minimum standards, regulatory floors, or 
heightened conservation targets are what this Article views as 
politically dynamic action in the forest management context. 
Second, political dynamism as understood in this Article is 
not about separate, comprehensive regulatory regimes at all 
levels of government, which could very well be a duplicative, 
conflicting, and inefficient harnessing of the regulatory process 
federalism aims to facilitate. Rather, political dynamism is about 
engaging all levels in the process of determining the best policy 
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across federal scales. Clearly if the federal government had legal 
authority in an area and maintained a comprehensive policy, the 
policy may lend itself to state and local governments playing a 
lesser (or implementary) role to the extent that they are satisfied 
with the policy. On the other hand, state or local governments 
may take the lead in developing comprehensive policies with the 
federal government only stepping in to address holes or 
regulatory failures within lower level policies. As Professor Engel 
argues, the constitutional empowerment of all levels of 
government in the process of determining a cross-cutting, scalar 
policy can facilitate optimal regulatory roles taking place within 
the appropriate scale of government.40 
C. Shift Toward Dynamic Federalism 
Having established how this Article uses the terms legal and 
political dynamism and dualism, this subpart turns to the 
current status of legal and political federalism in the United 
States. In recent decades the nation has moved toward dynamic 
regulatory approaches, both legally and politically, on most 
subject matters, especially in the environmental context. State 
and local governments have by and large always maintained 
constitutional authority to regulate environmental resources, 
primarily through their common law police power.41 Yet, once the 
federal government’s spate of environmental statutes enacted by 
Congress beginning in the 1970’s were constitutionally validated 
in the courts via expansion of federal Commerce Clause 
authority, a constitutionally dynamic environmental regulatory 
state was born for most environmental subject matters.42 The 
 40. See Engel, supra note 18, at 161 (stating that the static allocation of 
environmental management authority to one level of government is against the 
federalist principles underlying the Constitution, and that overlapping 
regulatory authority allows for a system of checks and balances in 
environmental regulation). 
 41. See Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 646–47 (1887) (stating that 
constitutionally a state may only restrain private property use through exercise 
of its police power, and determining that a proper exercise of that power is that 
which “is necessary and reasonable for guarding against the evil which injures 
or threatens the [general] welfare in the given case”). 
 42. See ROBIN KUNDIS CRAIG, CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES IN ENVIRONMENTAL 
LITIGATION: SOME REFLECTIONS ON RECENT LITIGATION AND PREDICTIONS FOR THE 
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federal government regulates endangered species, hazardous 
wastes, water quality, air quality, and other resources and types 
of pollution.43 States, however, also maintain the authority to 
regulate in those areas, either by implementing the federal 
regulatory regime or by going above and beyond the floor set at 
the federal level with individual state policies.44  
So, for example, the Endangered Species Act (ESA),45 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and 
Liability Act (CERCLA),46 Resource Conservation and Recovery 
Act (RCRA),47 Clean Water Act (CWA),48 and Clean Air Act 
(CAA),49 just to name a few federal environmental statutes, 
demonstrate that the regulation of the resources in those 
statutes is legally dynamic. Each of these statutes has been 
constitutionally validated, allowing the federal government to 
prescriptively and directly regulate the resource at issue, at 
least to a substantial extent. Yet, for each of these subject 
matters, subnational governments are constitutionally 
empowered to prescriptively regulate with legislation above or 
in addition to federal minimum standards. For the most part, 
states can establish their own endangered species,50 waste,51 
FUTURE 2 (2005), http://apps.americanbar.org/environ/committees/constlaw/ 
Craigpresentation.pdf (discussing the fact that when environmental laws were 
adopted under Congress’ Commerce Clause powers in the 1970s, the Supreme 
Court had not struck down Commerce Clause legislation for decades). 
 43. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 1533 (2012) (authorizing the federal government to 
classify species as endangered and threatened); 42 U.S.C. § 6928 (authorizing 
federal enforcement of violations of hazardous waste provisions); id. § 7409 
(authorizing the establishment of federal air quality standards). 
 44. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 29.1-564 (West 2014) (prohibiting the 
transportation, possession, and sale of any species listed on the federal 
endangered species list); id. § 10.1-1421 (allowing the state to recover the costs 
associated with cleaning up hazardous waste from persons who abandon 
facilities that handle hazardous waste). 
 45. Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544 (2012). 
 46. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability 
Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675 (2012). 
 47. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901–6992k 
(2012). 
 48. Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2012). 
 49. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q (2012). 
 50. See, e.g., Florida’s Endangered and Threatened Species Act, FLA. STAT. 
§ 379.2291 (2010) (protecting endangered and threatened species in Florida). 
 51. See, e.g., Missouri’s Hazardous Waste Management Law, MO. REV. 
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water,52 or air regulations,53 though some actions—mobile 
sources under the CAA, as just one example—may be preempted 
by the federal government (an indication that constitutional 
dualism can run both ways, with the federal government 
sometimes resisting potentially efficacious subnational regulatory 
inputs).54 Many states have chosen to make governance of these 
resources politically dynamic as well, developing policies 
supplemental to these federal statutes for endangered species, 
waste, water, and air regulation.55  
In short, dual federalism no longer reflects the U.S. 
environmental federalism status quo in that the federal 
government regulates a variety of purely local activities while 
state and local governments address issues of national and even 
global concern.56 Dynamic federalism more accurately describes 
STAT. §§ 260.350–.434 (2014) (creating state standards to be followed for the 
disposal of waste). 
 52. See, e.g., Washington’s Water Pollution Control Act, WASH. REV. CODE 
§ 90.48.010–.910 (2014) (ensuring high standards of water purity in Washington 
state). 
 53. See, e.g., California Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006, CAL. 
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 38500–38599 (West 2014) (creating environmental 
standards meant to mitigate the effects of global warming). 
 54. See Engel, supra note 18, at 184–87 (discussing the threat that 
preemption poses to principles of federalism). 
 55. See supra notes 50–53 (providing examples of U.S. state environmental 
legislation). 
 56. See Engel, supra note 18, at 167–68 (noting that state and local 
governments cannot effectively combat issues of global significance, such as 
climate change, because these issues produce externalities far beyond a single 
state’s borders). Most dynamic federalism literature is not debating the 
constitutionality of governance at certain levels but rather recognizes that for 
the most part there is concurrent authority between federal and state 
governments. As a result, most federalism scholarship in this area does not 
question what is constitutional but rather what form or structure of governance 
is best. For examples, see generally BARRY G. RABE, STATEHOUSE AND 
GREENHOUSE: THE EMERGING POLITICS OF AMERICAN CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY 1–
37 (2004) (discussing the split between federal and state environmental 
legislation and regulation); Barry G. Rabe, North American Federalism and 
Climate Change Policy: American State and Canadian Provincial Policy 
Development, 14 WIDENER L.J. 121, 128–51 (2004) (discussing the emerging role 
states have played in developing climate change policy); Marc K. Landy, Local 
Government and Environmental Policy, in DILEMMAS OF SCALE IN AMERICA’S 
FEDERAL DEMOCRACY 227 (1999) (discussing the increasingly important role 
decentralization has played in U.S. environmental policy); Alice Kaswan, 
Climate Change, Consumption, and Cities, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 253 (2009) 
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how many, if not most, federal and state regulatory interactions 
occur can be considered a positive development in the 
environmental context. Regulated natural resources are so 
inextricably interconnected, dynamic federalism appears the 
more appropriate normative theory of federalism to achieve 
successful legal and policy results on the ground.  
(discussing the need for both federal and state action in developing 
environmental policy); Tseming Yang & Robert V. Percival, The Emergence of 
Global Environmental Law, 36 ECOLOGY L.Q. 615 (2009) (discussing the 
emerging prevalence of a international standard for environmental law; and 
that standard’s impact on federal, state, and local law); David E. Adelman & 
Kirsten H. Engel, Reorienting State Climate Change Policies to Induce 
Technological Change, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 835 (2008) (stating that local legislation 
and regulation are often relied upon deal with the global issues raised by 
climate change); Robert B. Ahdieh, When Subnational Meets International: The 
Politics and Place of Cities, States, and Provinces in the World, 102 AM. SOC’Y 
INT’L L. PROC. 339 (2008) (discussing the role of federalism in international law); 
Richard B. Stewart, States and Cities as Actors in Global Climate Regulation: 
Unitary vs. Plural Architectures, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 681 (2008) (discussing the 
strong role that subnational governments play in climate regulation and 
legislation); Michael P. Vandenbergh, Jack Barkenbus & Jonathan Gilligan, 
Individual Carbon Emissions: The Low-Hanging Fruit, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1701 
(2008) (discussing the role that federal, state, and local regulation can play to 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions in the U.S.); B. Ahdieh, From Federalism to 
Intersystemic Governance: The Changing Nature of Modern Jurisdiction, 57 
EMORY L.J. 1 (2007) (noting that changes in the interaction between the federal 
government and state and local governments have resulted in expanding the 
power of the federal government); Alice Kaswan, The Domestic Response to 
Global Climate Change: What Role for Federal, State, and Litigation 
Initiatives?, 42 U.S.F. L. REV. 39 (2007) (discussing the emergence of climate 
change legislation at a variety of different levels of government); Robert B. 
Ahdieh, Dialectical Regulation, 38 CONN. L. REV. 863 (2006) (discussing the 
cross-jurisdictional interaction that has taken place between different 
regulators on local, state, and federal levels); Kirsten Engel, State and Local 
Climate Change Initiatives: What Is Motivating State and Local Governments to 
Address a Global Problem and What Does This Say About Federalism and 
Environmental Law?, 38 URB. LAW. 1015 (2006) (discussing the role that the 
increase in state and local environmental regulation plays in federalism); Judith 
Resnik, Law’s Migration: American Exceptionalism, Silent Dialogues, and 
Federalism’s Multiple Ports of Entry, 115 YALE L.J. 1564 (2006) (discussing the 
role that federalism plays in the development of international human rights 
law); David R. Hodas, State Law Responses to Global Warming: Is It 
Constitutional to Think Globally and Act Locally?, 21 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 53 
(2003) (discussing the role that local regulation plays on the global issue of 
climate change); Joseph W. Dellapenna, Law in a Shrinking World: The 
Interaction of Science and Technology with International Law, 88 KY. L.J. 809 
(2000) (discussing the necessity for legal issues relating to technology to be dealt 
with on a global and not local level). 
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Yet, for certain regulatory subject matter, remnants of dual 
federalism remain, notwithstanding expansion of recognized 
federal regulatory authority under the Commerce Clause over the 
last four decades. These remnants also form an integral part of 
the current scope of U.S. constitutional federalism.57 Direct 
land-use regulation, including subnational forest management, 
remains an area where strong notions that “states need a sphere 
of authority protected from the influence of the federal 
government” do in fact remain, regardless of normative claims 
that constitutional dynamism would result in better governance 
of the environment.58 These dynamic–dualist debates not only 
have implications for national versus subnational governance of 
resources in the Commerce Clause context but also international 
governance of resources, as evidenced by the nationalist and 
federalist debates on the scope of the Treaty Power.59 The next 
subpart describes how these remnants of dual federalism 
integrate into the otherwise dynamic environmental federalism 
that has taken hold over the last four decades to create a bimodal 
federalism governance framework. 
D. The Reality: Bimodal Federalism 
The term “bimodal federalism” simply means that two modes 
of federalism operate in the United States depending on the 
subject matter of regulation.60 Most regulation in the United 
 57. As Professor Schapiro has noted, “the basic conception of federalism 
continues to be a system of independent national and state governments that 
must be protected from each other” and that “[d]ualist conceptions survive” in 
some areas. Schapiro, supra note 35, at 246.  
 58. Engel, supra note 18, at 176. 
 59. See HUDSON, supra note 1, at 207–20 (2014) (providing a critical 
analysis of the restraints which the U.S. Constitution places on various levels of 
government in the U.S., hampering their ability to manage domestic resources); 
Blake Hudson, Climate Change, Forests and Federalism: Seeing the Treaty for 
the Trees, 82 U. COLO. L. REV. 363 (2011) (discussing the need to further explore 
the role of federalism in international treaties relating the climate change and 
forest management). 
 60. See Blake Hudson, Reconstituting Land Use Federalism to Address 
Transitory and Perpetual Disasters: The Bimodal Federalism Framework, 2011 
BYU L. REV. 1991 (2011). The word “bimodal” simply means “having or 
providing two modes, methods, [or] systems.” The word “bimodal” simply means 
“having or relating to two modes.” MERRIAM–WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 
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States may indeed occur in a dynamic manner as local 
governments are constitutionally empowered to regulate matters 
of state or national import and the federal government is 
constitutionally empowered to regulate matters of almost entirely 
local concern. In addition, all levels of government share and 
exercise regulatory responsibilities over much subject matter. 
Even so, we also see important remnants of dual federalism 
impacting governance across scalesand in particular in areas of 
natural resource management implicating land use (such as 
forest management). These remnants remain either because 
jurisprudence has not yet affirmed the validity of dynamic 
regulatory approaches in those areas or because legislators 
perceivebased on either genuine constitutional interpretation 
or rather political and ideological predispositionthat legal 
constraints exist and therefore politically refuse to act. A result of 
political inaction, of course, is that courts do not have an 
opportunity to assess the legal viability of dynamic regulatory 
approaches. In this way, legal perception of whether federalism is 
dynamic or dual is inextricably intertwined with the question of 
whether political action is taken at certain levels. In other words, 
perceptions of legal dualism drive political dualism and may chill 
regulatory efforts across scales as policy makers question their 
own legal authority to act.  
Identification of these dual federalism remnants can help 
policy makers maintain the appropriate baseline from which to 
make normative claims for constitutional dynamism that allows 
better protection of dynamic resources like subnational forests. 
While evidence of dual remnants is probably best represented by 
the continued debates over the scope of the Commerce Clause61 
122 (11th ed. 2011). 
 61. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Foreword: Limiting Raich, 9 LEWIS & CLARK 
L. REV. 743, 743 (2005) (arguing that the Commerce Clause has been overly 
broadened); Eric R. Claeys, Raich and Judicial Conservatism at the Close of the 
Rehnquist Court, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 791, 794–95 (2005) (describing the 
divergence that took place between originalist and minimalist approaches, as 
evidenced in the Raich decision); Dan Gildor, Preserving the Priceless: A 
Constitutional Amendment to Empower Congress to Preserve, Protect, and 
Promote the Environment, 32 ECOLOGY L.Q. 821, 824–30 (2005) (arguing that the 
constitutional underpinning for modern environmental policy is being brought 
into question, and that the Commerce Clause does not adequately encompass 
the ideals that underlay modern environmental policy); Thomas W. Merrill, 
Rescuing Federalism After Raich: The Case for Clear Statement Rules, 9 LEWIS & 
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and in continued discussions in both scholarly literature and 
judicial decisions lending support to the exclusive regulatory role 
of state and local governments over land use,62 other proof may 
be considered evidence by omission. The federal government has 
simply never attempted to assert direct regulatory inputs into 
subnational policies related to certain categories of land uses, like 
local zoning schemes (growth boundaries, density requirements, 
CLARK L. REV. 823, 844 (2005) (arguing that the “economic” requirement under 
Commerce Clause jurisprudence was largely gutted by Raich); Ernest A. Young, 
Just Blowing Smoke? Politics, Doctrine, and the Federalist Revival After 
Gonzales v. Raich, 2005 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 8–16 (2005) (discussing the federalist 
revival after the Raich decision); Sarah D. Van Loh, Note, The Latest and 
Greatest Commerce Clause Challenges to the Endangered Species Act: Rancho 
Viejo and GDF Realty, 31 ECOLOGY L.Q. 459, 462 (2004) (arguing that Congress 
should have the power to regulate intrastate species under the Commerce 
Clause); Christine A. Klein, The Environmental Commerce Clause, 27 HARV. 
ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 38 (2003) (arguing that federal environmental legislation may 
be subject to attack if the Court shifts its Commerce Clause jurisprudence from 
“activity” focused to “object” focused); Bradford C. Mank, The Murky Future of 
the Clean Water Act After SWANCC: Using a Hydrological Connection Approach 
to Saving the Clean Water Act, 30 ECOLOGY L.Q. 811, 844–46 (2003) (discussing 
the shift in Commerce Clause interpretation that took place in Lopez and 
Morrison); Bradford C. Mank, Protecting Intrastate Threatened Species: Does the 
Endangered Species Act Encroach on Traditional State Authority and Exceed the 
Outer Limits of the Commerce Clause?, 36 GA. L. REV. 723, 735–36 (2002) 
(discussing the narrowing of the Commerce Clause that took place in Lopez and 
Morrison); Eric Brignac, Comment, The Commerce Clause Justification of 
Federal Endangered Species Protection: Gibbs v. Babbitt, 79 N.C. L. REV. 873, 
883 (2001) (discussing the untenable nature of the justification for some 
environmental Commerce Clause precedent after Lopez and Morrison); Christy 
H. Dral & Jerry J. Phillips, Commerce by Another Name: The Impact of United 
States v. Lopez and United States v. Morrison, 68 TENN. L. REV. 605, 605 (2001) 
(discussing the fact that the Lopez and Morrison decisions called into question 
congressional action taken under the Commerce Clause, and arguing that the 
standards from the two cases are unworkable); Omar N. White, The Endangered 
Species Act’s Precarious Perch: A Constitutional Analysis Under the Commerce 
Clause and the Treaty Power, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 215, 235 (2000) (using Lopez to 
determine that “biological diversity is connected to commerce, and that 
meaningful limits to congressional authority exist with regard to the protection 
of biological diversity”); John Copeland Nagle, The Commerce Clause Meets the 
Delhi Sands Flower-Loving Fly, 97 MICH. L. REV. 174, 178–79 (1998) (using the 
Dehli sands flower-loving fly to analyze the impact of the Lopez decision on 
environmental regulation based on the Commerce Clause); Lori J. Warner, The 
Potential Impact of United States v. Lopez on Environmental Regulation, 7 
DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 321, 324 (1997) (discussing the complex federalism 
issues raised by the Lopez decision).  
 62. See infra notes 174–79 and accompanying text (discussing the historic 
reservation of land use and forest management power to the states). 
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etc.), nonpoint source pollution, or private forest management—
at least in part because of constitutional considerations.63  
Thus the full scope of U.S. federalism theory may be 
understood as increasingly integrating principles of dynamic 
federalism in combination with as of yet static principles of dual 
federalism. This integrated view of bimodal federalism more 
accurately and holistically describes how U.S. federalism 
operates in the context of present day constitutional scholarly 
debates and jurisprudence.64  
 63. For example, nonpoint source water pollution control has been left to 
the states largely due to its attachment with land use planning regulatory 
authority. Professor Craig argues that “[c]omprehensive federal regulation of 
nonpoint source pollution would thus arguably engage the federal government 
in land use regulation—a type of regulation historically viewed as belonging 
almost exclusively to more local levels of government” and that “because of 
federalism restrictions, Congress cannot and has not forced states to assume 
any regulatory burden with respect to nonpoint sources of water pollution. 
Therefore, regulation of nonpoint source polluters is left largely to states’ 
individual regulatory discretion.” Robin Kundis Craig, Local or National? The 
Increasing Federalization of Nonpoint Source Pollution Regulation, 15 J. ENVTL. 
L. & LITIG. 179, 182, 186 (2000). Craig goes on to say that “[s]o long as Congress 
operates within constitutional federalism requirements, its statutory judgment 
calls are subject to revision if new information or awareness indicates that the 
initial statutory division of power incorrectly reflects the true balance of the 
national and local interests at stake.” Id. at 181. Craig has also argued that  
a constitutional amendment could allow Congress to reenact the 
federal environmental statutes pursuant to that amendment’s grant 
of legislative authority, freeing them of any lingering Commerce 
Clause limitations and leaving Congress free to reach the last 
federally unregulated impediments to environmental quality—such 
as nonpoint source pollution—currently deemed to be outside the 
federal regulatory sphere. 
See Robin Kundis Craig, Should There Be a Constitutional Right to a 
Clean/Healthy Environment? 34 ENVTL. L. REP. 11013, 11019–20 (2004).  
 64.  As previously described by the author, 
Discussions of multi-scalar, dynamic solutions to federalism problems 
is certainly important, and the depth of analysis it provides helps 
curb oversimplification of both the need for and efficacy of different 
types of solutions to federalism-driven environmental concerns at 
different levels of government . . . . There is a danger, however, in 
allowing a focus on the very real benefits of dynamic federalism to 
detract from recognition of the current constitutional federalism 
reality. Despite the clear attractiveness of dynamic federalism in 
achieving better on-the-ground environmental and land-use law and 
policy responses—the normative claim for how federalism often does 
and perhaps should operate—the fact remains that while it may not 
be preferable from an environmental or land-use perspective, dualism 
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Even though scholars supporting constitutional dynamic 
federalism argue that federalism should not be judicially or 
politically protected,65 and though they question whether courts 
have the “ability to police the contours of federalism” under 
doctrines like the Commerce Clause,66 remnants of dual 
federalism demonstrate that judicial protections remain in place 
and courts continue to be in “the business of distinguishing 
between regulatory matters that are left to the states and those 
that fall within Congress’s jurisdictional reach.”67 Until the 
federal government seeks direct land-use planning, nonpoint 
source water pollution, or subnational forest management inputs 
via legislative means and such legislation is either 
constitutionally validated or denied by the courts, notions of 
constitutional dualism on these subject matters will remain 
unresolved, and courts will continue to engage in judicial 
protections of federalism by wrangling over constitutional 
provisions like the Commerce Clause.68  
Herein lies the importance of understanding bimodal 
federalism. By focusing so stringently on normative claims that 
the courts should stop wrangling over judicial protections of 
federalism, and should stop policing the bounds of the Commerce 
Clause or federal preemptive authority, there is a risk that 
scholars may miss important opportunities to make sound 
arguments about why, even within a framework of dualistic 
limits on the Commerce Clause, for example, certain regulatory 
subject matter should still be validated as constitutionally 
dynamic. In other words, advocates miss an opportunity to 
still informs constitutional federalism jurisprudence in some areas—
this, of course, is the descriptive constitutional reality. 
Hudson, supra note 60, at 2032. 
 65. See Schapiro, supra note 35, at 278–80 (discussing arguments for 
moving beyond legally enforced federalism limits). 
 66. Engel, supra note 18, at 174. 
 67. Id. at 183. It may be true that “such line drawing forces the Court into 
making superficial distinctions of little relevance to the issue of whether federal 
regulation is truly appropriate.” Id. at 184. Whether the federal government 
should be able to regulate certain subject matters, however, is a distinct 
question from current judicial interpretations of constitutional structure. 
 68. See id. at 174 (discussing the current disconnect between the actual 
practice of environmental federalism and the theories that are advocated by 
scholars). 
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discuss why regulation of certain dynamic resources meets the 
current constitutional tests for providing constitutional 
governance authority at all levels of government. Under current 
constitutional tests, for example, how would urban growth 
boundaries or subnational forest policies be validated under the 
Commerce Clause? As a political matter, should we not begin 
thinking about how federal regulatory safety nets could be 
crafted to avoid the damaging threats of urban sprawl and 
deforestation in the coming decades? These will be crucial 
questions going forward if the federal government is to act as a 
failsafe to protect resources threatened by state inaction in these 
regulatory subject areas. The federal government had to assume 
this role in the 1970s due to state inaction on water and air 
quality, and a new wave of regulatory dynamism will be called for 
in the coming decades as economic development and urban 
sprawl continue to replace important natural capital resources 
and if states continue to tend toward inaction—and indeed, states 
continue to maintain countervailing incentives to permanently 
appropriate natural capital for the sake of economic 
development.69 The next Part analyzes specifically where U.S. 
forest policy is placed along the dynamic–dual federalism 
spectrum with a view toward understanding the implications of 
its current placement.  
III. U.S. Forest Policy Situated on the Dynamic–Dual Federalism 
Spectrum 
Though often overlooked in legal scholarship, which focuses 
almost entirely on federal forests, jurisprudence has long 
considered subnational forest regulation a state and local 
government regulatory role and has placed it in a subcategory of 
direct land use regulation generally. As described in this Part, 
U.S. forest policy is dominated by strong dualist notions that 
state and local governments maintain exclusive constitutional 
 69. See Blake Hudson, Federal Constitutions: The Keystone of Nested 
Commons Governance, 63 ALA. L. REV. 1007, 1038–50 (2012) (discussing the 
incentives state and local governments face that cause them to seek short-term 
economic gains resulting in long-term, aggregated environmental harms). 
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authority to regulate land use generally,70 and subnational 
forests specifically, through their zoning and suite of other police 
powers.71 One only has to look to recent controversies where 
states and other subnational units have vehemently argued 
against federal intrusion into forest management activities to 
find evidence of these dualist attitudes.72 For example, the recent 
Supreme Court case Decker v. Northwest Environmental Defense 
Center73 involved a dispute over whether private foresters were 
required to receive a national Pollutant Discharge Elimination 
System (NPDES) permit under the Clean Water Act for 
stormwater discharged from ditches along logging roads.74 In an 
amici brief,75 the National Governors Association, National 
Association of Counties, National Conference of State 
Legislatures, International City/County Management 
Association, and Council of State Governments argued that such 
a requirement was unlawful because, among other things, the 
forest management activities in question were “traditionally 
regulated by state and local governments under their own 
laws.”76 More significantly, the coalition of subnational 
 70. These regulations may take the form of structural zoning through the 
use of building height restrictions or lot setback lines, or may take the form of 
use zoning that designates the location of commercial, residential, agricultural, 
industrial, or other types of development. In the natural resource context these 
regulations may take the form of urban growth boundaries intended to curtail 
destructive urban sprawl that replaces important natural capital. 
 71. See Hudson & Rosenbloom, supra note 7, at 1290 (“Subnational 
governments in the United States, on the other hand, maintain a wide range of 
tools to regulate agricultural activities, particularly those related to their police 
power to regulate land use activities.”). 
 72. See Blake Hudson, supra note 59, at 365 (“Though private forest 
management regulation, and land use regulation generally, have long been the 
purview of state and local regulatory authority in the United States, federal and 
international regulatory bodies have taken a growing interest in forest 
management decisions.”). 
 73. 133 S. Ct. 1326 (2013). 
 74. See id. at 1330. 
 75. Brief for the National Governor’s Association et al. as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Petitioners, Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326 (2013) 
(Nos. 11-338, 11-347), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/ 
supreme_court_preview/briefs/11-338_petitioneramcungaetal.authcheckdam.pdf. 
 76. Id. at 15. The amici argued:  
If an agency interprets a statute as authorizing federal intrusion into 
areas traditionally regulated by state and local governments, such as 
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government organizations noted that “[the U.S. Supreme] Court 
has held that the Constitution’s Commerce Clause, U.S. Const. 
art. I, § 8, cl. 3, limits Congress’ power to enact laws that 
‘effectually obliterate the distinction between what is national 
and what is local.’”77 The Decker case is a particularly compelling 
example of state protectionism of forest management authority 
because it involved the regulation of activities indirectly related 
to forest management (water runoff) under a federal statute that 
regulated another resource (the Clean Water Act).78 How much 
more so might state and local governments resist federal 
“intrusion” into direct forest management activities, such as 
those related to clear-cut and stand density requirements, 
afforestation and reforestation requirements, road building 
requirements, or direct forest preservation? 
Ultimately, even though the federal government maintains 
indirect regulatory mechanisms that impact subnational forest 
management activities, such as the Endangered Species Act or 
Clean Water Act, state and local governments otherwise exercise 
this suite of powers almost exclusively.79 These powers are 
exercised—or perhaps more importantly in the subnational forest 
management context, often not exercised—in the absence of 
needed minimum standards set at a higher level of government 
and aimed at the protection of the nation’s aggregated forest 
capital.80 This has exacerbated problems of urban sprawl, among 
other forest management threats, as courts’ continued 
declaration that land use planning is the “quintessential state 
water use and land use, countervailing principles of federalism come 
into play that limit deference to the agency’s interpretation. Under 
these principles of federalism, Congress presumptively does not 
authorize federal intrusion into areas traditionally regulated by state 
and local governments unless it speaks clearly and unequivocally. 
Id. at 16–17. 
 77. Id. at 17. 
 78. See Decker, 133 S. Ct. at 1333 (noting that the lawsuit challenged 
federal Clean Water Act permitting for stormwater discharged during timber 
extraction). 
 79. See Hudson, supra note 60, at 1995 n.16 (noting that state governments 
maintain primary responsibility to regulate land use under their police power to 
protect the general welfare). 
 80. See Hudson, supra note 69, at 1012 (noting that some states have 
robust forest management programs while others have some of the least 
rigorous standards in the world). 
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and local government power”81 causes the federal government to 
perceive a lack of constitutional authority to set limits on the 
mode and expanse of local development activities that impact 
forest resources.82 As a result, an ever-expanding, human-built 
environment rapidly replaces forests and important associated 
ecosystem services. As detailed below, a recent U.S. Forest 
Service Report highlights that forests face serious threats over 
the next fifty years. The southeastern states alone, where 86% 
of forests are privately owned, are projected to lose up to 13% of 
their forests due to urbanization, population growth, invasive 
species, and climate change by 2060.83 While it may be 
conventional wisdom to consider deforestation a problem of the 
Amazon, Indonesia, or other developing countries, this loss of 
U.S. forests would be a significant blow to domestic forest 
resources and the services they provide as well as utilization of 
global forests to combat climate change.84 Nearly 20% of yearly 
global carbon emissions have resulted from forest loss and 
degradation in recent decades.85 The threat that the aggregated 
poor forest management standards of U.S. subnational 
governments pose for domestic forest resources and the global 
climate change mitigation and other ecosystem services 
provided by forests cause the dualistic, undynamic approach to 
subnational forest management to be increasingly unworkable. 
 81. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 738 (2006). 
 82. See Hudson & Rosenbloom, supra note 7, at 1278 (describing potential 
limits on federal authority to control certain types of resource management). 
 83. This is 23 million acres of forestland, or an amount equal to all of the 
forests in the states of Georgia or Alabama. WEAR & GREIS, supra note 5, at 26–
35. 
 84. See Hudson, supra note 59, at 365–66.  
 85. ERIN C. MYERS, POLICIES TO REDUCE EMISSIONS FROM DEFORESTATION 
AND DEGRADATION (REDD) IN TROPICAL FORESTS, RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE 6 
(2007), http://www.rff.org/documents/RFF-DP-07-50.pdf. 
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A. The Importance of U.S. Forest Resources and the Forest 
Regulatory Framework 
1. Importance of U.S. Forests Locally, Nationally, and Globally 
Though forests may have historically been thought of as the 
quintessential local resource, being anchored to the land of 
individual property owners, the national and global importance of 
local forests is becoming ever more apparent.86 Consider the 
variety of services provided by forests on local scales: 
• a renewable source of building materials and associated 
jobs; 
• a renewable source of paper products and associated jobs; 
• clean air services that filter and trap air pollutants; 
• clean water services that prevent nutrient, chemical, and 
other nonpoint run-off from entering waterways; 
• protection of fisheries by mitigating run-off 
eutrophication that leads to “dead zones”; 
• flood control services; 
• endangered and other animal species habitat; 
• regulation of local ambient air temperatures in urban and 
rural areas during the summer; 
• energy cost savings for households and businesses; 
• aesthetic values; 
• cultural values; 
• recreational values.87 
Yet in recent decades the role of forests in national and global 
well-being has become increasingly apparent, particularly the 
role of forests as a global climate regulator and major carbon sink 
or source.88 The nearly 20% of yearly global carbon emissions 
resulting from forest loss and degradation over recent decades89 
is an amount greater than emitted by the global transportation 
 86. See Hudson, supra note 69, at 1029–30 (noting that while land use 
regulation has been the purview of state and local governments, new 
coordination among state governments is necessary given the depletion of 
resources). 
 87. See UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, FOREST SERVICE, 
Ecosystem Services, http://www.fs.fed.us/ecosystemservices/ (last visited Sept. 
24, 2014) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 88. See Hudson & Rosenbloom, supra note 7, 1275 (noting that resources 
that act as carbon sinks are crucial to regulating climate change). 
 89. MYERS, supra note 85, at 5. 
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sector each year.90 As a result, mechanisms to protect forests 
globally are on the agenda of both international climate 
negotiations and negotiations related to establishing a global 
sustainable forest management regime.91 Not only does forest 
destruction constitute a substantial source of atmospheric carbon, 
but one recent U.S. Forest Service report found that one-third of 
global carbon emissions are absorbed by forests each year, 
making forests the most significant terrestrial carbon sink on the 
planet.92 As a result, forest preservation has a multiplied effect 
on greenhouse gas regulation, and, correspondingly, forest 
destruction doubly amplifies concentrations of carbon in the 
atmosphere as it constitutes both a source of carbon and the loss 
of a significant carbon sink. 
The United States alone contains nearly 8% of the world’s 
total forest cover.93 While deforestation is commonly considered a 
problem of developing nations like Brazil or Indonesia, the 
 90. Id. at 4.  
 91. See MCDERMOTT ET AL., supra note 11, at 4–6 (“Most recently, 
realization of the significance of climate change impacts of greenhouse gas 
emissions from deforestation and forest degradation has brought renewed 
impetus to efforts to conserve and better manage forests globally.”); see also A. 
Angelsen, REDD Models and Baselines, 10 INT’L FORESTRY REV. 465 (2008) 
(discussing the possibility of setting national emissions standards); T. Johns et 
al., A Three-Fund Approach to Incorporating Government, Public and Private 
Forest Stewards Into a REDD Funding Mechanism, 10 INT’L FORESTRY REV. 458, 
459 (2008) (arguing that international efforts to prevent deforestation should be 
sufficiently flexible to allow for regional differences across countries); A. 
Karsenty et al., Summary of the Proceedings of the International Workshop “The 
International Regime, Avoided Deforestation and the Evolution of Public and 
Private Policies Towards Forests in Developing Countries” Held in Paris, 21–
23rd November 2007, 10 INT’L FORESTRY REV. 424, 424 (2008) (discussing 
international efforts to address deforestation in developing nations); K. Levin et 
al., The Climate Regime as Global Forest Governance: Can Reduced Emissions 
from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD) Initiatives Pass a ‘Dual 
Effectiveness’ Test?, 10 INT’L FORESTRY REV. 538, 539 (2008) (advocating for a 
results-based test for determining the effectiveness of global deforestation 
initiatives). 
 92. Press Release, United States Forest Service, U.S. Forest Service Finds 
Global Forests Absorb One-Third of Carbon Emissions Annually (July 14, 2011), 
available at http://www.fs.fed.us/news/2011/releases/07/carbon.shtml (last 
visited Sept. 24, 2014) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 93. JACEK P. SIRY ET AL., XIII WORLD FORESTRY CONGRESS, GLOBAL FOREST 
OWNERSHIP: IMPLICATIONS FOR FOREST PRODUCTION, MANAGEMENT, AND 
PROTECTION 3 tbl.1 (2009) (noting that the United States maintains 302 million 
hectares of the world’s approximately 4 billion hectares of forest). 
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projected loss of 13% of forest cover in the Southeast would be a 
significant blow to the carbon sequestration capabilities of forests 
domestically and globally. Furthermore, this number does not 
include potential deforestation outcomes in other parts of the 
United States due to the same drivers of urbanization and 
climate change.94 As a result, the total amount of U.S. 
deforestation may very well be higher, though reforestation in 
other areas may mitigate or even outpace some of that 
deforestation.  
The significance of U.S. forest loss is not only calculated in 
sheer scientific terms of lost carbon sink potential. The political 
message that U.S. deforestation could send to the rest of the 
world would do great damage to the overall goal of forest 
preservation and the slowing of deforestation in the developing 
world—that is: “Stop cutting down your forests, even though we 
will continue to cut ours.” Furthermore, as described below, one 
of the primary concerns among scientists is that threats to U.S. 
forests will make it virtually impossible even to stabilize national 
forest stocks, much less increase forest stocks to mitigate the 
worst case climate change impacts. 
2. U.S. Forest Policy Regulatory Framework and Policy Options 
The federal government maintains regulatory inputs into the 
approximately 35% of forestland that it owns, while state 
governments are currently responsible for regulating the 
remaining 60% of forests owned by private individuals and 5% 
owned by subnational governments.95 As depicted in Figure 1 
below, and as described in greater detail in Part III.B, federal and 
subnational forest policy options in the United States can be 
situated along a spectrum, regarding both the level of forest 
policy stringency and the range of forest values protected. The 
scope of forest management standards can range from virtually 
nonexistent (in many states), to very basic (focusing primarily on 
 94. See MYERS, supra note 85, at 6–8. 
 95. U.N. ENV’T PROGRAMME, GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT OUTLOOK 3: PAST, 
PRESENT AND FUTURE PERSPECTIVES 110 (2002), http://www.unep.org/geo/GEO3/ 
english/pdfs/chapter2-3_forests.pdf.  
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timber extraction and fundamental silvicultural96 practices), to 
those that seek to protect the full range of values provided by 
forests, including climate mitigation values. Forest management 
standard stringency might range from voluntary guidelines, to 
incentive-based programs, to prescriptive regulation.  
Hence, on one end of the spectrum is a policy of maintaining 
no standards for many or all categories of forest management, 
neither through direct regulation nor incentives and 
information.97 Next are voluntary procedural or substantive 
forest guidelines, whereby governments provide forest owners 
with information regarding suggested procedures (such as 
management plans or environmental impact assessment 
methods) or suggested substantive standards (which may range 
from basic standards to standards related to the full scope of 
forest values).98 Many states, for example, maintain only 
voluntary best management practice guidelines on forest 
management.99 Next along the spectrum are programs aimed at 
promoting, through monetary incentives or otherwise, voluntary 
forest management efforts that capture a range of values, from 
the very basic, timber extraction-centric forest standards to more 
robust standards related to carbon sequestration and forest 
ecosystem service functions, including biodiversity.100 
 96. Silviculture is “a branch of forestry dealing with the development and 
care of forests.” Silviculture Definition, MERRIAM–WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE 
DICTIONARY 1161 (11th ed. 2011).  
 97. See Hudson, supra note 69, at 1013 (detailing that private forest 
managers in some states can use forest capital unchecked because of low forest 
management standards). 
 98. See Hudson, supra note 59, at 365 (describing an example of Alabama’s 
suggested best management practices). 
 99. JAN G. LAITOS ET AL., NATURAL RESOURCES LAW 849 (1st ed. 2006) (“The 
laws related to timber management vary depending on whether it takes place on 
private, state, tribal, or federal lands . . . . [s]tate timber laws regulate the 
forestry industry by requiring practices designed to minimize water pollution, 
soil erosion, and fire dangers, and by encouraging or requiring deforestation.”). 
Yet most states do not place legally binding forest management standards upon 
private forest managers. As described by Professor Rose, “[a]lthough a few 
states have laws that regulate forest practices on private land, most rely upon 
voluntary best management practices and technical assistance.” Gerald A. Rose 
et al., Forest Resources Decision-Making in the U.S., in THE POLITICS OF 
DECENTRALIZATION: FORESTS, PEOPLE AND POWER 238, 238 (Carol J. Pierce Colfer 
& Doris Capistrano eds., 2005). 
 100. See JOHNSON, supra note 13, at 16 (describing financial incentives and 
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Further along the spectrum are prescriptive “basic” forest 
management regulatory standards that are fundamental for good 
silviculture. Such standards primarily focus on maximizing value 
from timber extraction, though in certain areas of the forest, like 
watersheds, they also provide co-benefits like watershed 
protection and erosion control. These standards include (but are 
not limited to) five primary standards. First, riparian streamside 
buffer zones in forested watersheds prevent erosion that might 
interfere with timber production, prevent sedimentation of 
waterways, provide wildlife corridors, regulate water 
temperatures, and protect aquatic habitat.101 Second, forest road 
standards address the problems associated with road building, 
described as “one of the ‘main causes [of] the environmental 
degradation of most forest regions.’”102 Forest roads provide 
greater access for resource extraction and potential 
over-exploitation, cause erosion that damages watersheds, and 
lead to fragmentation of forest landscapes and habitat.103 As a 
result, decommissioning roads, limiting their location, reducing 
their extent, and placing limitations on culvert size at stream 
crossings are important forest management objectives. Third, 
clearcut standards aim to address “perhaps the most 
controversial forest harvesting practice”—clearcutting, which has 
been criticized by ecologists, civil society, and forest market 
scholars alike.104 Clearcutting effectively involves a complete 
removal and replacement of the forest, which can not only 
damage long-term forest productivity but can also interfere with 
a variety of other ecological processes.105 The removal of so much 
technical assistance used in federal programs). 
 101. See MCDERMOTT ET AL., supra note 11, at 15 (describing the benefits of 
riparian buffer zones). 
 102. Id. at 16 (quoting Raffaele Spinelli & Enrico Marchi, Food and 
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, A Literature Review of the 
Environmental Impacts of Forest Road Construction, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
SEMINAR ON ENVIRONMENTALLY SOUND FOREST ROADS AND WOOD TRANSPORT 
(1996), available at http://www.fao.org/docrep/X0622E/x0622e0p.htm#TopOfPag
e (last visited Sept. 24, 2014) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 103. See MCDERMOTT ET AL., supra note 11, at 16–17 (describing the 
exploitation that forest roads cause). 
 104. Id. at 18. 
 105. See, e.g., NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, What is Clearcutting, 
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stored carbon, as well as removal of the carbon sequestering 
potential of the forest, has serious consequences for regulating 
greenhouse gases. Limiting clearcut size can avoid these negative 
effects. The final two forest management standards are 
reforestation standards, which specify time frames for replanting 
or achieving stocking levels, and annual allowable cut standards, 
which implement cut limits based on sustained yield.106 These 
standards ensure that no more of the forest resource is harvested 
than is sustainable.107 
Moving along the spectrum beyond basic forest management 
standards are carbon sequestration-centric standards that are 
inclusive of protections provided by basic standards, but which 
are also aimed at maximizing carbon potential of forests (i.e., 
more robust clear-cutting prohibitions or stand density 
requirements than basic standards). Though these standards 
capture more values than basic standards, in their efforts to 
maximize forest carbon they may do so at the expense of other 
forest values, such as biodiversity and overall ecosystem 
functionality. Indeed, one concern in the climate change context 
is the replacement of ecologically functional and richly biodiverse 
forests with monoculture plantations of forests aimed at 
sequestering as much carbon as possible over short time scales.108  
Last on the spectrum are ecosystem-centric forest standards 
that focus on ecosystem functionality and a wide range of other 
values, such as protection of biodiversity, species habitat, 
ecosystems, genetic resources, recreational and cultural values, 
and the provision of water purification, flood prevention, air 
http://www.nrdc.org/land/forests/fcut.asp (last visited Sept. 24, 2014) (describing 
the impacts of removal of forest carbon sinks) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review). 
 106. See MCDERMOTT ET AL., supra note 11, at 19 (describing reforestation 
standards). 
 107. See id. at 19–20. 
 108. See Raquel Nunez Mutter & Winnie Overbeek, The Great Lie: 
Monoculture Trees as Forests, U.N. RESEARCH INST. FOR SOC. DEV. (Oct. 20, 
2011), http://www.unrisd.org/80256B3C005BE6B5/search/531DAFFB8B319F69 
C125792E00499ED1?OpenDocument (last visited Sept. 24, 2014) (noting that 
monocultures are highly susceptible to diseases and drought) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review); see also Kristin B. Hulvey et al., Benefits of 
Tree Mixes in Carbon Plantings, 3 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 869–74 (2013) 
(showing empirically that diversity among tree species can increase carbon 
sequestration). 
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quality regulation, and even certain timber commodity 
services.109 These standards basically amount to forest 
preservation standards, while allowing selective cutting or 
controlled burns to, for example, prevent the buildup of fuel that 
may later result in a catastrophic fire.110 Some degree of 
management may also be necessary because it is unclear whether 
a pure form of forest preservation maximizes forest carbon to the 
greatest degree possible if it occurs to such a degree that forest 
“succession”111 or natural fire events cease and the forest becomes 
carbon saturated and unable to sequester additional amounts of 
carbon dioxide. It was long thought that saturation may exist in 
old-growth forests where human interference with natural 
processes (like fire) prevents regeneration of new, productive 
forest ecosystems that sequester even greater amounts of carbon 
from the atmosphere.112 Recently, however, scientific studies shed 
doubt on the idea that older, pristinely preserved forests are less 
productive at sequestering carbon.113 As a result, it may very well 
be that simple forest preservation would maximize both carbon 
sequestration capabilities and capture the many other ecological 
values provided by forests. Regardless, even with pure, 
 109. See RASBAND ET AL., supra note 2, at 1206–09; BASTIAAN LOUMAN ET AL., 
Forest Ecosystem Services: A Cornerstone for Human Well-Being, in 22 INT’L 
UNION OF FOREST RES. ORGS. WORLD SERIES, ADAPTATION OF FORESTS AND PEOPLE 
TO CLIMATE CHANGE—A GLOBAL ASSESSMENT REPORT 15, 16–20 (Risto Seppälä et 
al. eds., 2009) available at http://www.iufro.org/science/gfep/embargoed-
release/download-by-chapter/ (follow “Download chapter 1” hyperlink) (last 
visited Sept. 24, 2014) (providing examples of ecosystem-centric forest 
standards) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 110. See LOUMAN ET AL., supra note 109, at 20 (describing the adaptive 
capabilities of forests). 
 111. Brian Finegan, Forest Succession, 321 NATURE 109 (Nature Publishing 
Group 1984), http://www.planta.cn/forum/files_planta/finegan1_108.pdf.  
 112. Though, of course, carbon emissions from forest fires must be weighed 
against a renewed cycle of succession. 
 113. Bettina Boxall, Big, Old Trees Keep Growing and Capturing Carbon, 
Study Finds, LOS ANGELES TIMES (Jan. 15, 2014), available at 
http://www.latimes.com/science/sciencenow/la-sci-sn-old-trees-carbon-capture-
20140115,0,5642959.story#ixzz2s13Ox9kK (last visited Sept. 24, 2014) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see also N.L. Stephenson et al., Rate 
of Tree Carbon Accumulation Increases Continuously With Tree Size, NATURE 
(Jan. 15, 2014), available at http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/vaop/ 
ncurrent/full/nature12914.html (last visited Sept. 24, 2014) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
                                                                                                     
DYNAMIC FOREST FEDERALISM 1679 
ecosystem-centric forest preservation standards it seems that 
some form of forest management is needed to balance the full 
range of forest values, from carbon sequestration, to timber 
commodities, to biodiversity and other resource protections. In 
addition, not all forest ecosystems are the same, and so the 
broadest, ecosystem-centric forest preservation standards in one 
region of the country may look very different from those in 
another part of the country.  
Figure 1 
 
Having established the basic regulatory framework and 
policy options for U.S. forests, including the primary regulators of 
forests at different scales and the range and stringency of 
management standards they might seek to utilize, this Article 
now turns to a discussion of how the implementation of these 
standards is fragmented in a dualistic way between federal and 
state governments, with the federal government only maintaining 
inputs into federal forestlands, and state and local governments 
left alone to decide the fate of the remaining 65% of the nation’s 
forests. State and local governments, in turn, are grossly 
inconsistent regarding the quality and stringency of their forest 
policies—if they even maintain standards at all. This fragmented 
federalism in the forestry arena will likely facilitate the grave 
threats projected to affect U.S. forest resources in the coming 
decades. 
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B. The Threats to U.S. Forests: A Southeastern Case Study 
As highlighted above, the federal government maintains 
regulatory authority over the approximately 35% of forests it 
owns while state governments are responsible for regulating the 
nearly 65% of forests owned by private individuals and 
subnational governments.114 While U.S. federal government 
forest policies are quite consistent on the 35% of forestland it 
owns, state forest policies in the United States are grossly 
inconsistent, with some states maintaining stringent basic forest 
management standards, and others maintaining none at all. 
Subnational forest management discrepancies have stark 
ramifications for not only domestic forest resources but for the 
global battle against climate change—especially if the United 
States sought to establish a national policy to harness domestic 
forests as carbon sinks.  
McDermott et al. provided a framework for assessing and 
comparing the domestic forest policies of governments around the 
globe.115 The study identified four “styles” of forest policy 
regulation: 
 
1. Voluntary Procedural: encourage the voluntary 
development of forest management processes or 
plans, but do not require such plans to be 
developed.116 
2. Mandatory Procedural: require the development of 
forest management plans or procedures.117 
3. Voluntary Substantive: specific forest practice 
guidelines exist, but they are not binding on forest 
managers.118 
4. Mandatory Substantive: establish “mandatory, on-
the-ground requirements or restrictions, such as a 
rule that no timber harvest may occur within x 
 114. U.N. ENV’T PROGRAMME, GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT OUTLOOK 3: PAST, 
PRESENT AND FUTURE PERSPECTIVES 110 (2002), available at http://www. 
unep.org/geo/GEO3/english/pdf.htm (follow “Forests” hyperlink) (last visited 
Sept. 24, 2014) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 115. See MCDERMOTT ET AL., supra note 11, at 7–11 (discussing frameworks 
for comparative forest policy analysis). 
 116. Id. at 10. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
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meters of a river of y width.”119 These rules are, of 
course, enforceable at law. 
McDermott et al. matched one of these four “styles” of forest 
policy regulation in each national or subnational government 
studied with five types of forest policy standards. For each 
standard, the authors assigned an “indicator” used to classify the 
policy approach as one of the four “styles” of regulation.  The type 
of standard and associated indicators are as follows:  
1. Protection of riparian zones in forested watersheds 
(indicator: riparian streamside buffer zone rules). 
2. Protection from environmental damage caused by 
roads (indicator: rules for culvert size at stream 
crossings and road decommissioning). 
3. Protection from clearcutting damage (indicator: 
clearcut size limits or other relevant cutting rules). 
4. Reforestation (indicator: requirements for 
reforestation, including specified time frames and 
stocking levels). 
5. Limitations on annual allowable cut (indicator: cut 
limits based on sustained yield).120 
As discussed in Part III.A, the five forest policy standards 
assessed by McDermott et al. are the most fundamental of forest 
management and silvicultural standards, and, of course, a variety 
of additional standards can build upon this baseline to ensure 
that forests are managed for the full suite of services they 
provide.121 Even so, these five basic standards provide a variety of 
important protections for forest resources, and the presence or 
absence of policies aimed at basic forest standards acts as an 
indicator for the likelihood of more holistic policies at present and 
in the future within specific jurisdictions.  
McDermott et al. found dramatic differences between the 
“styles” of riparian buffer zone, road, clearcut, reforestation, and 
annual allowable cut forest policies applied by the U.S. states.122 
Governments are ranked based on an average of the “style” 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. at 15–19. 
 121. See RASBAND ET AL., supra note 2, at 1206–09; LOUMAN ET AL., supra 
note 109, at 16–20.  
 122. See MCDERMOTT ET AL., supra note 11, at 327 tbl.10.7. 
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utilized for each of the five indicators. Mandatory approaches 
place governments nearer to “10” on the scale (with mandatory 
substantive the most stringent) and voluntary or no policy places 
governments nearer to “0.”  
The state of California and the U.S. Forest Service each score 
a “9” on the scale, maintaining very high forest policy 
standards.123 The U.S. state of Washington scores a high “8” on 
the scale,124 while Oregon scores a “7,” Idaho scores a “5,” and 
Alaska scores a “4.”125 Lowest on the scale are the states of 
Montana with a “2.5,” Louisiana and Virginia with a “2,” and the 
entire rest of the southeastern United States—Alabama, 
Arkansas, Georgia, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, 
and Texas with a score of “1.”126 To provide context for the 
southeastern states’ level of forest policy stringency, consider that 
developing countries average a “6.7” on the scale while nine 
southeastern states average a “1.2,” maintaining entirely 
voluntary “guidelines” or no standards at all.127 
As these rankings indicate, while some U.S. states maintain 
high forest management standards, others, particularly in the 
Southeast, maintain no enforceable standards at all.128 The 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
 127. To be clear, “it cannot be assumed that regions with higher levels of 
regulation are actually performing better than those with lesser levels.” Id. at 
350. A lack of institutional enforcement capacity and other issues of 
implementation may render forest standards on paper far less efficacious than 
voluntary standards in countries with better management practices on the 
ground. See id. at 10 (discussing four styles of forest policy regulation: voluntary 
procedural, mandatory procedural, voluntary substantive, and mandatory 
substantive). Yet, maintaining legal standards on paper within countries that 
respect the rule of law and do maintain institutional enforcement capacity 
remains important, as it provides some environmentally sound standards to 
which citizens can legally hold the government and their fellow citizenry 
accountable, even if other voluntary programs or cooperative arrangements are 
made to achieve better compliance and to take advantage of boots on the 
ground. See id. at 342 (noting that there is a “demand for prescriptive 
regulations to ensure high environmental performance from forest managers” 
around the world). 
 128. See id. at 327 tbl.10.7. These lax standards have implications for other 
resources beyond forests and fail to facilitate the protection of forest habitat 
critical to species protection. See id. at 82. Indeed, there is a sharp contrast 
between the regulatory standards for forests in the Southeast and the high 
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implications of these lax standards in the southeastern United 
States for both domestic forest health and global climate change 
mitigation are profound, providing a compelling example of how 
dynamic changes in our understanding of the nature of a resource 
(here, a carbon sink needed to combat climate change) 
demonstrates a need to move beyond dualist notions of federalism 
in the case of subnational forest regulation.  
The implications of a failure to transition to dynamic 
federalism in U.S. forest policy are perhaps best evidenced by the 
recent U.S. Forest Service’s Southern Forests Futures Project 
Summary Report (Futures Report).129 The Futures Report 
highlighted in dramatic fashion the pressure that southeastern 
U.S. forests will face in the coming decades. The project focused 
on four factors that would “define the South’s future forests,”130 
and include: population growth, climate change,131 timber 
markets, and invasive species.132 Urban development, in 
particular, is “forecasted to result in forest losses, increased 
carbon emissions, and stress to other forest resources,”133 
including degradation of a variety of water ecosystem services 
amount of biodiversity in the region. See id. at 90. Alabama, for example—the 
state that “[avoids] environmental problems through voluntary application of 
preventative techniques,” id. at 82—also happens to have the third highest 
number of listed threatened or endangered species under the ESA of any state 
in the United States, only trailing Hawaii and California. U.S. FISH AND 
WILDLIFE SERVICE, SPECIES REPORTS, http://ecos.fws.gov/tess_public/pub/ 
stateListingAndOccurrence.jsp (last visited Sept. 24, 2014) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review); see also MCDERMOTT ET AL., supra note 11, at 
94 fig.3.5 (showing number of endangered and threatened animal species in 
Canadian provinces and U.S. states). 
 129. See WEAR & GREIS, supra note 5, at 4 (studying in the report thirteen 
state forest policies, including: Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, 
Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Tennessee, Kentucky, Mississippi, Arkansas, 
Louisiana, Oklahoma and Texas). 
 130. Id. 
 131. See id. at 27 (noting that average annual temperatures are expected to 
increase in the region 2.5 to 3.5 degrees Celsius by 2060). 
 132. See id. at 4 (describing the factors that will define the South’s future 
forests). 
 133. Id. Since the 1970s total forest area has been stable, but this stability is 
a result of agricultural lands being reforested at the same rate that 
urbanization has reduced forest cover. Id. at 15. While urbanization is expected 
to increase at even higher rates, conversion of agricultural lands to forests is not 
expected to continue. Id. at 31. 
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such as flood control and water filtration—even to the point of 
threatening public health.134 Population pressures in the 
Southeast would “result[] in declines in forest cover, increases in 
demand for ecosystem service[s], and restrictions that complicate 
the ability to manage forests for the full spectrum of uses.”135 
Importantly, both population and economic growth have 
increased at higher rates in the Southeast than anywhere else in 
the United States,136 “with the resulting urbanization steadily 
consuming forests and other rural lands.”137  The Futures Report 
projected that 30 to 43 million acres of southern land will 
succumb to urban development by 2060, while total forest losses 
could be as high as 33 million acres, or approximately 13% of all 
forestland in the South.138 This amount of deforestation is 
roughly equivalent to cutting down all the forest in the states of 
Georgia or Alabama.139  The negative repercussions of these 
projections go beyond the environment as the forest industry in 
the South could also be damaged.140 The southern timber 
 134. The report notes that:  
[s]trong population growth and associated urbanization has increased 
demand for water and challenged water availability in several 
areas . . . . Conversion of forests to urban and other land uses has 
resulted in a loss of natural buffering, increasing water pollution 
loads, elevating peak flows, and reducing base flows in affected 
watersheds. The consequences are more frequent and more severe 
flooding, lower stream flows during drought conditions, and water 
quality that is degraded—sometimes to the point of threatening 
public health . . . . [T]he link between conversion of forest land to 
urban uses and degraded water quality in affected watersheds is well 
accepted. 
Id. at 24. 
 135. Id. at 26. From 1970 to 2010, population in the South grew by 88%, and 
disposable personal income more than doubled. Id. at 6 fig.2. Further, from 1990 
to 2008, population in the South grew at a rate approximately one-third faster 
than the nation as a whole. Id. at 71. These pressures do not appear to show any 
sign of letting up. Population in the South is expected to grow yet another 40% 
to 60% from 2010 to 2060. Id. at 12–13. 
 136. See id. at 6 fig.2, 71 (showing that population in the South grew by 88% 
from 1970 to 2010 and increased at a rate around one-third faster than the 
nation as a whole from 1990 to 2008). 
 137. Id. at 5. 
 138. Id. at 35. 
 139. Id. at 31. 
 140. See id. at 62 (noting that the forest industry land base may become less 
stable, despite its recent status as a predictable component of the southern 
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production sector contributed more than 1 million jobs and $51 
billion in employee compensation in 2009.141 In fact, “southern 
forests are the most intensively managed forests in the [United 
States].”142 A majority of the United States’ lumber is harvested 
from southern forests,143 and “since 1986, if the South were 
compared with any other country, none would produce more 
timber than this one region of the United States.”144 
Forest losses due to rapid urbanization also profoundly and 
negatively impact the carbon storage capacity of southern 
forests.145 The amount of carbon sequestered in southern forests 
and their soils is projected to reach a maximum in 2020,146 and 
then decline by as much as 5% by 2060.147 Such a decline in 
carbon storage capacity “would be a challenge for carbon 
mitigation policies, presenting a dynamic baseline where a first 
order policy objective would be to stabilize rather than expand 
forest carbon stocks.”148 So even if forest management-driven 
climate change mitigation policies were to be enacted by 
southeastern states, southeastern forests would not only be 
unable to sequester additional amounts of carbon needed to fight 
climate change, but it would be exceedingly difficult to prevent 
forest carbon stocks from dropping even further and becoming an 
even greater source of atmospheric carbon.149 Furthermore, given 
the lack of political will to formulate important and fundamental 
forest management standards in the Southeast, it is hard to 
imagine prescriptive climate mitigation policies even being put 
forest landscape). 
 141. Id. at 17. 
 142. Id. at 29. 
 143. Id. at 5. 
 144. Id. at 17. 
 145. Id. at 34. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Robert Hugget et al., Forecasts of Forest Conditions, in THE SOUTHERN 
FOREST FUTURES PROJECT, TECHNICAL REPORT 17 (2011), available at 
http://www.srs.fs.usda.gov/futures/reports/draft/Frame.htm (follow “Chapter 5” 
hyperlink) (last visited Sept. 24, 2014) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). 
 148. WEAR & GREIS, supra note 5, at 34 (emphasis added). 
 149. See id. (“The potential decline in carbon storage would be a challenge 
for carbon mitigation policies, presenting a dynamic baseline where a first order 
policy objective would be to stabilize rather than expand forest carbon stocks.”). 
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into place by southeastern states in the near future. Both the 
implementation and success of such policies would be 
undermined because countervailing land use policies promoting 
and facilitating rapid urbanization are also widespread. 
Given the southeastern United States’ governance 
philosophy regarding forests and land use and the high 
percentage of forests privately owned in the Southeast, a more 
dynamic regulatory approach for subnational forest management 
is needed. This approach would involve the federal government 
maintaining constitutional authority to coordinate subnational 
forest policy with the implementation of minimum forest 
management standards. In the absence of a dramatic shift in 
governance culture in the Southeast, and a voluntary adoption of 
stronger forest policies by individual states, deforestation of the 
region is likely to ensue unabated in the absence of a national 
policy.150 Alabama’s position on voluntary “best management 
practices” is emblematic of this governance philosophy.151 The 
Alabama Forestry Commission declares that it is the “lead agency 
for forestry in Alabama” but that it is “not an environmental 
regulatory or enforcement agency” and that it “[avoids] 
environmental problems through voluntary application of 
preventative techniques.”152 Yet, as evidenced by the Futures 
Report’s projected loss of up to 13% of the region’s forests over the 
next fifty years, when given the choice between preserving a 
forest or managing it for the full range of ecological values, and 
cutting it down in the name of economic development and 
urbanization, voluntary choices often do not lead to “preventative 
techniques” that benefit forests.153 Even so, most southeastern 
state administrative agencies operate similarly as “[t]he 
implementation of BMPs [Best Management Practices] . . . 
 150. See Hudson, supra note 69, at 1010 (“[I]f a higher level of government 
does not maintain the constitutional authority to coordinate subnational action, 
then each government's individualized ‘rationality’ may result in 
overconsumption of natural capital . . . .”). 
 151. See MCDERMOTT ET AL., supra note 11, at 82 (detailing the contours of 
Alabama’s hands-off policy toward forest management). 
 152. Id. 
 153. See WEAR & GREIS, supra note 5, at 35 (describing the threats to 
forestland in the South). 
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generally involves agencies not directly responsible for 
environmental regulation.”154 
Constitutionally dual federalist forest policy is nothing 
unique to the United States. In Canada, for example, dualism is 
quite clear from the text of the Canadian Constitution, and 
therefore the Canadian federal government is even more 
restricted that the U.S. federal government in the area of 
subnational forest management policy.155 Canada’s provinces 
actually own 77% of the nation’s vast forest resources and also 
maintain constitutional authority to regulate directly the 7% of 
forests in private ownership.156 Canada’s constitution actually 
contains explicit provisions relegating forest policy to the 
provinces for non-federally-owned forests.157 These provisions 
have made it virtually impossible for the Canadian federal 
government to get any foothold whatsoever on subnational forest 
policy.158 Even so, in Canada the most fundamental of 
subnational forest policies, as described by McDermott et al., 
remain fairly robust because of provincial ownership of forests 
and the fact that the provinces are negotiating with a handful of 
industry players for the management of forests in what has been 
described as a “quasi-corporatist” negotiations.159 
Contrast the situation in Canada with that in the U.S. South. 
In the southeastern United States, rather than having a few 
primary industrial players negotiating with the government 
regarding the extraction of the government’s own resources, we 
see forest industries and a vast array of nonindustrial private 
 154. MCDERMOTT ET AL., supra note 11, at 82. 
 155. See Hudson, supra note 59, at 371 n.26 (noting that Canada’s 
Constitution Act of 1867 grants the provincial governments exclusive 
responsibility for forest management). 
 156. See CAN. COUNSEL OF FOREST MINISTERS, SUSTAINABLE FOREST 
MANAGEMENT IN CANADA 4, (2010), http://www.sfmcanada.org/images/ 
Publications/EN/Sustainable_Management_Policies_EN.pdf (detailing that most 
of Canada’s forests are owned by the provinces). 
 157. See Hudson, supra note 59, at 371 n.26 (“In fact, scholars have noted 
that the 1982 amendments to Canada's Constitution placed it ‘beyond dispute 
that the provinces are primarily responsible for forest management.’”). 
 158. See id. (noting the issues the Canadian federal government faces over 
forest policy). 
 159. Blake Hudson, Fail-safe Federalism and Climate Change: The Case of 
U.S. and Canadian Forest Policy, 44 CONN. L. REV. 925, 960 (2012). 
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forest owners managing privately owned forestlands, largely 
absent of inputs from governments who are hesitant to place 
restrictions on private property rights. Eighty-six percent of 
southern forests are privately owned, and forest ownership is 
highly fragmented. While 60% of privately owned forests are 100 
acres or more, 59% of all private forest owners own less than 9 
acres of forestland,160 and family forest holdings in the region 
average only 29 acres in size.161 As a result, “a large number of 
individuals may choose to act ‘rationally’ regarding the 
appropriation of forest resources, maximizing personal gain to the 
detriment of the subnational, national, and global resource 
base—either through poor forest management practices or 
through replacement of forest resources with human-made 
capital in the form of urbanization.”162 The high number of 
private property owners in the southeast correlates strongly with 
the low level of forest policy stringency adopted by subnational 
governments there. In the West, where the proportion of public 
forests is far greater, forest policy is far more stringent. So, for 
example, California, Washington, Oregon, Idaho, and Alaska 
maintain an average 67% of forests in public ownership163 and in 
turn maintain far more stringent forest policy standards for both 
public and private forests (a “6.7” average) than do states in the 
southeastern United States (a “1.2” average), with its 86% of 
privately owned forests.164 McDermott et al. call this a forest 
policy “spillover effect,” where proximity to public forests, which 
tend to be managed more stringently, spills over into private 
forest management policy.165 It seems that the United States 
Forest Service’s “9” score on the forest policy ranking does seem 
to have spilled over into western forest policy in a way not seen in 
 160. WEAR & GRIES, supra note 5, at 62. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Hudson, supra note 159, at 964; see also Hudson, supra note 69, at 
1013. 
 163. MCDERMOTT ET AL., supra note 11, at 80 tbl.3.3. 
 164. WEAR & GREIS, supra note 5, at 58. The 86% of forests in the South that 
are privately owned account for almost the entire amount of timber harvested in 
the south. Id. 
 165. See MCDERMOTT ET AL., supra note 11, at 346 (describing the spillover 
effect). 
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the Southeast.166 This comes as no real surprise considering that 
92% of federally owned land is located in the western United 
States, contrasted with less than 5% in the South.167 
Southeastern states, 
simply do[] not maintain the critical mass of publicly owned 
forests that would help facilitate a spillover effect, as again, 
eighty-six percent of forests are privately owned.  Though 
other factors, such as overall governance culture and the 
limited administrative capacity of southeastern governments, 
may also contribute to the region’s lax standards, it seems that 
the lack of a spillover effect further exacerbates continuation 
of the status quo.168 
Ultimately, southeastern states’ exercise forest policy 
discretion allows them to avoid the establishment of basic, 
fundamental forest management standards, much less craft 
standards meant to curb urban sprawl and the loss of 13% of 
southeastern forests over the next fifty years. Thus, 
setting the stage for a tragedy of the commons in the forest 
policy arena, as state governments maximize their own 
citizens’ use of forest resources in their jurisdictions to the 
detriment of a forest base defined more broadly by national 
boundaries and that takes into account the value of forests 
across and beyond subnational boundaries.169 
If forest policy regulation were legally and politically dynamic, 
then these threats might be more readily addressed. But as 
discussed in the next subpart, the status of U.S. forest policy as 
being legally and politically dual creates an institutional hurdle 
that only exacerbates these threats to U.S. forests. 
C. U.S. Forest Federalism: Legally and Politically Dual 
Given the policy options that might be taken at the federal 
and state levels to better manage important forest resources and 
avoid the threats to U.S. forests in coming decades, it is 
 166. See id. (noting that higher public land regulations contributed to 
similarly high private land regulations). 
 167. WEAR & GREIS, supra note 5, at 71. 
 168. Hudson, supra note 159, at 966. 
 169. Id. at 962. 
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important to analyze the institutional drivers that currently 
impede a much-needed dynamic federalist regulatory approach to 
managing U.S. forest resources. To that end, this subpart briefly 
describes the constitutional status of regulatory authority over 
subnational forests and how the current federal programs aimed 
at subnational forests, limited in scope and voluntary in nature, 
simply are not enough to forestall the major threats to the 
nation’s forest resources.  
1. The Constitution and Jurisprudence on Subnational Forests 
The U.S. Constitution provides no explicit constitutional 
authority for either the federal government or the states to 
regulate the 65% of U.S. forests in either private or state 
ownership.170 As a result, subnational forest management 
regulation has long been considered a role reserved for the state 
governments under the Tenth Amendment of the Constitution, 
undertaken pursuant to state and local authority to regulate land 
use.171 States maintain the responsibility of regulating land use 
under their authority to exercise the “police power” to protect the 
“general welfare.”172 The Tenth Amendment reserves powers not 
constitutionally granted to the federal government for the states 
and places limits on Congress’s regulatory authority “in traditional 
areas of state and local authority, such as land use.”173 Land use 
regulation “has always been a creature of state and local law.”174 
 170. See Hudson, supra note 69, at 1012. 
 171. See id. (describing the traditional police power states and localities 
maintain to regulate land use). 
 172. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 646–47 (1887). 
 173. James R. May, Constitutional Law and the Future of Natural Resource 
Protection, in THE EVOLUTION OF NATURAL RESOURCES LAW AND POLICY 124, 132 
(Lawrence J. MacDonnell & Sarah F. Bates eds., 2010) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). Other scholars have noted that “[t]he weight of legal and 
political opinion holds that this allocation of power in [the United States] leaves 
the states in charge of regulating how private land is used.” JOHN R. NOLON ET 
AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LAND USE AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT 17 (7th 
ed. 2008). 
 174. Marci A. Hamilton, Federalism and the Public Good: The True Story 
Behind the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 78 IND. L.J. 
311, 335 (2003). 
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Euclid v. Ambler Realty175 has been described as a “sweeping 
paean to the supremacy of state regulation over private 
property,”176 and the U.S. Supreme Court itself has recognized 
“the States’ traditional and primary power over land . . . use,”177 
and that “[r]egulation of land use . . . is a quintessential state and 
local power.”178 Regarding subnational forest management more 
specifically, scholars have recognized that “[u]nder the US 
Constitution, the federal government has limited authority and 
responsibility; all other powers are reserved for the states. 
Forestland management and use was one such reserved 
power.”179 
The historical categorization of private forest standard 
setting within the genre of land use planning more generally has 
resulted in a federalism landscape for U.S. forest policy that is 
legally and politically dualistic. Unlike virtually all other 
categories of natural resources, where the federal government 
maintains at least some prescriptive regulatory foothold, the 
federal government has never before claimed direct regulatory 
authority over the 65% of U.S. forests that are subnationally 
owned. This is despite the fact that, as described in the previous 
Part, subnational forest management policies are grossly 
inconsistent across the United States, and in a number of states 
 175. 272 U.S. 365 (1926). 
 176. PAUL GOLDSTEIN & BARTON H. THOMPSON, JR., PROPERTY LAW: 
OWNERSHIP, USE AND CONSERVATION 967 (2006). 
 177. Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cnty. v. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 
159, 174 (2001) (“[R]egulation of land use [is] a function traditionally performed 
by local governments.”) (citing Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 
30, 44 (1994)). 
 178. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 738 (2006) (emphasis added); 
see also FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 768 n.30 (1982) (“[R]egulation of 
land use is perhaps the quintessential state activity.”) (emphasis added).  
 179. Rose et al., supra note 99, at 238–39; see also LAITOS, supra note 99 
(“The laws related to timber management vary depending on whether it takes 
place on private, state, tribal, or federal lands . . . [s]tate timber laws regulate 
the forestry industry by requiring practices designed to minimize water 
pollution, soil erosion, and fire dangers, and by encouraging or requiring 
deforestation.”). Despite maintaining the regulatory authority to do so, most 
states do not place legally binding forest management standards upon private 
forest managers. As noted by scholars, “[a]lthough a few states have laws that 
regulate forest practices on private land, most rely upon voluntary best 
management practices and technical assistance.” Rose, supra, at 238 (emphasis 
added). 
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forest management decisions are made at the complete whim of 
individual property owners.  
2. Current Federal Involvement in Subnational Forest Policy: A 
Collection of Insufficient Incentives 
The primary federal programs aimed at forest conservation 
are few and are only voluntary, incentive-based programs. To be 
clear, these programs will play an important role if there is to be 
any comprehensive forest policy across scales. But to the extent 
that they are of relatively limited impact, and more robust 
prescriptive regulatory intervention is necessary, they are simply 
not enough to constitute a truly dynamic policy approach to forest 
management.  
Perhaps the most prominent of these programs is the Forest 
Legacy Program (FLP).180 The FLP is implemented by the Forest 
Service and state forestry agencies in an effort to prevent the 
conversion of private forestlands to nonforest uses. This is 
achieved primarily through the purchase of conservation 
easements.181 The federal government may fund up to 75% of 
conservation easement project costs while the remaining 25% 
comes from private, state, or local sources.182 A number of other 
similar programs may be utilized to encourage landowners to 
preserve forests, but as with the FLP these have very little 
impact on the primary forest management activities of most 
forest owners. Even so, the U.S. Department of Agriculture offers 
a variety of programs that offer financial assistance or 
conservation easement creation for the conservation of 
nonindustrial private forestlands, including the Environmental 
 180. Forest Legacy Program: Protecting Private Forest Lands from 
Conversion to Non-Forest Uses, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, 
FOREST SERVICE, http://www.fs.fed.us/spf/coop/programs/loa/aboutflp.shtml (last 
visited Sept. 24, 2014) [hereinafter Forest Legacy Program] (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review); see also Jessica Owley & Stephen J. 
Tulowiecki, Who Should Protect the Forest?: Conservation Easements in the 
Forest Legacy Program, 33 PUB. LAND & RES. L. REV. 47, 55–65 (2012) 
(explaining the background, mechanics, and general concerns of the Program). 
 181. Owley & Tulowiecki, supra note 180, at 55–65. 
 182. Forest Legacy Program, supra note 180. 
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Quality Incentives Program,183 the Conservation Stewardship 
Program,184 and the Healthy Forests Reserve Program.185 
Although these programs may arguably represent a mild form of 
political dynamism, in that these federal incentive programs 
represent at least some federal political action aimed at 
subnational forests, it is not the robust type of political dynamism 
needed to forestall the threats to U.S. forests in the coming 
decades. In other words, to the extent that states fail to act to 
protect forest resources the federal government needs to establish 
a more robust minimum standards scheme—a regulatory policy 
that states can then supplement with primary police power 
regulations. In fact, the current collection of federal programs 
seems to be voluntary rather than regulatory as a direct result of 
remnant notions of constitutional dualism. The federal 
government, perceiving constitutional federalism constraints for 
any type of prescriptive regulatory inputs, created programs that 
the states or private property owners can opt into on a voluntary 
basis, thus skirting any constitutional federalism constraints.  
Ultimately, the politics of U.S. forest policy is currently tilted 
toward the dual end of the federalism spectrum, whereby the 
federal government maintains direct forest management 
regulatory inputs only into federal forests and provides very 
limited incentive-based or voluntary programs for the 
management of subnational forests. On the other hand, states 
may or may not maintain comprehensive forest management 
policies. Similarly, in states where forest policies are lax, they 
may or may not allow local governments to develop their own 
forest policies. Though we have seen a transition to more dynamic 
understandings of constitutional allocation of regulatory 
authority in the environmental context over the last century, that 
transition is not yet “complete,” whatever that term may come to 
 183. Environmental Easement Program, 16 U.S.C. § 3839 (2012). 
 184. Conservation Stewardship Program, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., NATURAL 
RESOURCES CONSERVATION SERVICE, http://www.nrcs.usda.gov/wps/portal/nrcs/ 
main/national/programs/financial/csp (last visited Sept. 24, 2014) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 185. Healthy Forests Reserve Program, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., NATURAL 
RESOURCES CONSERVATION SERVICE, http://www.nrcs.usda.gov/wps/portal/ 
nrcs/main/national/programs/easements/forests (last visited Sept. 24, 2014) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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mean. As a result, the dualistic nature with which we view forest 
policy in the United States as a political matter may cause 
damage to U.S. forest resources. Both the ecology and economics 
of modern forestry has shifted, and neither ecology nor economics 
supports the legal entrenchment of dualism in the area of U.S. 
forest policy. 
D. Implications of Legal and Political Dualism for U.S. Forests 
and the Normative Case for Dynamism 
The implications of maintaining a legally and politically dual 
federalist approach to U.S. forest policy are stark. This subpart 
first makes a normative argument that the historically 
understood basis for maintaining dualism in forest policy has 
been undermined by new understandings of the forest resource, 
ecologically and economically. The subpart then discusses how 
legal dualism informs political action, or the lack thereof, 
regarding the management of the nation’s forests—a state of 
affairs that must be addressed before the nation can move toward 
more dynamic forest policy. Finally, the subpart discusses how 
changes in ownership and use of forests over the last two decades 
are outpacing the shift toward dynamic regulatory approaches for 
forests, which provides an even more urgent need for adoption of 
the normative suggestions of this Article.  
1. The Fallacy of a Forest Federalism “Matching Principle” 
Federalism scholarship is rife with descriptive and normative 
assertions about how the Constitution does or should allocate 
regulatory authority among levels of government.186 One of the 
primary foundations for dual federalist arguments, at least in the 
forest context, is Butler and Macey’s “matching principle,” which 
argues that the jurisdiction regulating a resource should match 
the geographic scope of the regulated resource.187 Some have 
criticized this type of descriptive analyses as overly simplistic 
because it does not account for the many externalities that spill 
 186. Supra notes 56, 61; Schapiro, supra note 35; Engel, supra note 18. 
 187. Butler & Macey, supra note 19. 
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over jurisdictional boundaries, the increasing scientific 
recognition of the interconnectedness of resources in the natural 
environment, and the benefits that multilevel governance can 
provide.188 Nonetheless, the matching principle does seem to 
drive the perpetuation of dualist notions of land use planning 
generally and private forest management specificallythat state 
and local governments (or even just private property owners) are 
best positioned to direct local development or forestry activities 
due to better access to information and the direct assumption of 
the local benefits and burdens of development or timber 
extraction. In addition, another dualistic argument for forest 
policy seems to be that private forest landowners and state and 
local governments are best situated to design management 
standards for regulating forest resources clearly anchored to 
specific, discernible plots of land. 
Society’s understanding of the role of forests as a “stationary” 
resource, however, is rapidly changing. Though each tree may be 
anchored to an individual plot of land, forests may now be 
conceptualized as fluid as the waters regulated under the federal 
Clean Water Act or the air regulated under the federal Clean Air 
Act. As discussed in Part III.B., maintaining or increasing the 
carbon stocks sequestered by U.S. forests requires a large, 
functional forest spreading across private property lines and state 
and local government jurisdictional boundaries. In a legally and 
politically dualistic federal system, if each subnational 
government decided it was in its best interest to promote 
development for economic growth while maintaining lax forest 
management standards, then each government might “rationally” 
appropriate most of the forest resources within its jurisdictional 
boundaries.189 Such action would have dramatic interstate 
commercial impacts on not only carbon mitigation potential of 
forests (the regulation of which would be akin to regulation of air 
 188. See Engel, supra note 18, at 165–66 (“[T]he scholarly preoccupation 
with a rigid allocation of state and federal environmental regulatory authority is 
misguided for a number of reasons.”); Jim Salzman & J.B. Ruhl, Climate 
Change, Dead Zones, and Massive Problems in the Administrative State: A 
Guide For Whittling Away, 98 CAL. L. REV. 59, 69–70, 103–106 (2010) 
(characterizing the “matching principle” as a one of many “misguided policy 
‘panaceas’”). 
 189. See HUDSON, supra note 1 (analyzing the impact of federal governance 
on local, national, and global resource management). 
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pollutants under the federal Clean Air Act) but also water quality 
(implicating the federal Clean Water Act) and biodiversity 
(implicating the federal Endangered Species Act). It would also 
adversely affect more directly the future economic viability of the 
forest products industry—an industry which, in the Southeast 
alone, has provided millions of jobs and contributed billions of 
dollars annually to the economic productivity of the nation.190 As 
noted earlier, no other country in recent decades has produced as 
much timber as the southern United States.191 Despite the 
historic conceptualization of forest resources as local resources 
anchored to the ground within discrete private property or 
government jurisdictional boundaries, there is a strong 
foundation for arguments regarding the constitutional validity of 
federal minimum forest standards legislation that state and local 
governments can supplement in a dynamic manner. The ability to 
craft a comprehensive domestic climate program that harnesses 
the power of forests to combat climate change will depend in part 
on moving toward a dynamic conception of forest federalism. 
Following on this legal foundation, there should be political 
action at all scales to craft effective multiscalar, dynamic forest 
policies. 
2. The Legal Perspective, Political Reality Conundrum 
Politically, federal reticence to engage in subnational forest 
management standard setting may be called into question, given 
that, legally, the interstate commercial impacts of subnational 
forest management are becoming increasingly apparent. As a 
result, scholars and policy makers should establish a foundation 
of arguments for the constitutional validity of federal legislation 
aimed at addressing holes in subnational forest policy pursuant 
to Commerce Clause authority.192 To adequately manage these 
dynamic resources, there should be as much overlap as possible 
 190. WEAR & GREIS, supra note 5, at 17. 
 191. Id. 
 192. See generally Blake Hudson, Commerce in the Commons: A Unified 
Theory of Natural Capital Regulation Under the Commerce Clause, 35 HARV. 
ENVTL. L. REV. 375 (2011) (providing novel legal arguments for the regulation of 
resources under the Commerce Clause). 
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in jurisdictional regulatory authority between local governments, 
state governments, and the federal government to capture the 
benefits of dynamic federalism. To the extent that one level of 
government is not adequately addressing subnational forest 
management, other levels of government should be 
constitutionally permitted to fill the void.193  
Yet for governments to do so, the lay of the federalism land, 
so to speak, must be fully understood. It is exceedingly difficult to 
determine whether the constitutional status of subnational forest 
management is solidly dual based on the jurisprudence, which in 
turn informs political decisions to treat them as such, or rather 
whether we have simply politically chosen to leave those areas 
within the dualist domain and therefore do not test the 
constitutional waters to assess the validity of that legal 
perception. In other words, legal perception drives political 
reality and vice versa in these areas, and determining the true 
driver of the status quo is to engage in an intellectual endeavor 
quite like pondering the grandfather paradox of time travel.194 
Regardless of this difficulty, there can be no excuse for political 
inaction if the legal arguments are clear. Legal perception must 
change so that political reality can follow. Otherwise, political 
dualism will continue to guide subnational forest management 
policy as policy makers perceive a legally dualistic status for 
subnational forest management.  
For legal perception to change, scholars and analysts must 
make sound arguments that certain forms of federal prescriptive 
regulation of dynamic resources like subnational forests pass 
constitutional muster under the Commerce Clause. This way, 
legislative mechanisms for managing dynamic resources across 
levels of governance will move beyond being normatively 
desirable, and will also be constitutionally permissible in areas 
 193. As Professor Engel has noted, there is “danger [in] charging any one 
level of government with environmental protection and closing the door to the 
policy-making efforts of other levels of government.” Engel, supra note 18, at 
181. 
 194. The grandfather paradox of time travel is a logical conundrum. If a 
grandson travels back in time to a point before his father was born and kills his 
grandfather, then the grandson will have prevented his own birth, which raises 
a question: How did the grandson travel back in time in the first place? See 
DAVID LEWIS, THE PARADOXES OF TIME TRAVEL 4–5 (1976), http:// 
www.csus.edu/indiv/m/merlinos/Paradoxes%20of%20Time%20Travel.pdf. 
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where dualistic notions currently remain. Such a foundation can 
serve as a reference point for legislators seeking to implement 
effective solutions without constitutional complication and for 
courts adjudicating conflicts over the allocation of regulatory 
authority. As a result, the balance of federal and subnational 
inputs may be struck in a more dynamic way—a balance that 
may call for greater federal inputs in circumstances where 
subnational governments fail to act on matters increasingly 
implicating interstate commerce and the national interest, or a 
balance that may call for subnational governments to design even 
more effective policies than could be designed by the federal 
government. 
3. An Increasingly Urgent Challenge: Changes in the Ownership 
and Use of Forest Resources Outpace a Needed Shift to Dynamic 
Federalism 
The entire issue of federal involvement in subnational forest 
management is complicated by the perpetual, and even 
increasing, entrenchment of dualistic perspectives on subnational 
forests. Dynamic shifts in the ownership and use of today’s forest 
resources may be outpacing the needed shift toward dynamic 
forest policy. For example, despite the importance of forest 
resources both globally and in the United States, a curious forest 
governance scenario has arisen over the last two decades. 
Between 1998 and 2010 there was a massive shift in the 
ownership and use of forest resources in this country. Twenty 
years ago a significant portion of southeastern forests were 
owned by private industrial corporations, such as Weyerhaeuser, 
International Paper, and Georgia Pacific, among other paper 
companies.195 These corporations generally maintained 
responsible forest management practices—though they did so 
voluntarily, since, as discussed in Part III.B above, states in the 
 195. See Southern Forest Ownership, SOUTHERN FORESTS FOR THE FUTURE, 
http://www.seesouthernforests.org/discover-southern-forests/solutions/ownership 
(last visited Sept. 24, 2014) (“In the past, [companies that owned forests] were 
primarily integrated industrial forest product firms, but increasingly corporate 
forest ownership has become dominated by real estate investment trusts and 
timber investment management organizations.”) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). 
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southeast maintain little to no forest management regulatory 
standards. Nonetheless, if the federal government sought 
legislative inputs into private forest management activities of 
entities engaged in timber production, it likely could do so rather 
easily pursuant to constitutionally dynamic federalism principles. 
The United States Congress could pass a “Carbon Sequestration 
and Forest Management Act” asserting constitutional dynamism 
and testing the waters of judicial interpretation regarding the 
scope of Congress’ Commerce Clause authority. Such an act could 
establish mechanisms that utilize forests to sequester carbon to 
combat climate change, restrictions on clearcutting, afforestation 
and reforestation requirements, annual allowable cut, stand 
density requirements, riparian buffer zones to protect the 
nation’s waters, or perhaps even habitat fragmentation standards 
aimed at biodiversity, to name a few example policies. If found 
constitutional by the judiciary, then the federal government could 
allow state and local governments to formulate their own forest 
standards within the federal standards framework, thus 
establishing a dynamic federalism approach. 
The federal government could do so because the markets into 
which these timber products flow are clearly part of interstate 
commerce, and any court assessing the constitutionality of such 
federal legislation would likely find it viable under the Commerce 
Clause’s substantial effects test.196 As noted above, timber 
production in the South alone, with its high proportion of private 
forestland subject predominantly to state jurisdiction, contributed 
more than 1 million jobs and $51 billion of employee 
compensation in 2009.197 Also as noted, southeastern forests are 
“the most intensively managed forests in the United States,”198 
from which a majority of the United States’ lumber is 
harvested.199 Furthermore, federal regulation would reach the 
activities of private property owners notwithstanding any other 
constitutional complications, such as Fifth Amendment takings 
claims, because 89% of U.S. timber is harvested from private 
 196. See generally Hudson, supra note 192. 
 197. Id.; WEAR & GREIS, supra note 5, at 17. 
 198. WEAR & GREIS, supra note 5, at 29. 
 199. Id. at 5. 
                                                                                                     
1700 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1643 (2014) 
lands.200 A variety of other natural resources on private lands are 
reached by constitutionally validated federal regulation when 
appropriation of those resources has substantial effects on 
interstate commerce.201 For example, the Endangered Species 
Actwhich is probably the best illustration of the shift toward 
dynamic federalism in the natural capital context in the United 
Stateshas been held constitutional even as applied to entirely 
intrastate species with arguably tenuous connections to 
interstate commerce.202 It seems clear, then, that timber products 
as a commodity harvested by large-scale industrial owners and 
the interstate markets into which they flow more readily support 
the case for meeting the substantial effects test under Commerce 
Clause analysis than do endangered species that are not 
exchanged on the open market.203 
In the southeastern United States, however, between 1998 
and 2010, large commercial interests rapidly divested much of 
 200. U.S.D.A., U.S. FOREST FACTS AND HISTORICAL TRENDS 7 (2001) 
http://fia.fs.fed.us/library/briefings-summaries-
overviews/docs/ForestFactsMetric.pdf. Carbon flux, or the net difference 
between carbon removal and carbon addition to the atmosphere, is 50% greater 
on public forestlands in the United States than on private forestlands, most 
likely resulting “from greater land use conversions and disturbance (including 
timber harvest) on private forests relative to public forests.” Eric M. White & 
Ralph J. Alig, Public and Private Forest Ownership in the Context of Carbon 
Sequestration and Bioenergy Feedstock Production—A Briefing Paper on 
Existing Research and Research Needs 9–10 (2010), http://www. 
fsl.orst.edu/lulcd/Publicationsalpha_files/White_Public_Private_Briefing.pdf. 
 201. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 22 (2005) (upholding the federal 
regulation of marijuana); United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 
U.S. 121, 133 (1985) (upholding the regulation of wetlands by the federal 
government); Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 326 (1981) (upholding the federal 
regulation of minerals); Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n,, 452 
U.S. 264, 281 (1981) (upholding the federal regulation of minerals); Wickard v. 
Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128–29 (1942) (upholding the federal regulation of 
wheat); see also Babbitt v. Sweet Home Ch. Cmtys. for a Great Ore., 515 U.S. 
687, 708 (1995) (noting that Congress has exercised its delegated powers in 
crafting the Endangered Species Act); Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 
194 (1978) (stating that Congress not only has the power to create legislation, 
but also to determine the relative priority for the country). 
 202. See Rancho Viejo, LLC v. Norton, 334 F.3d 1158, 1158 (D.C. Cir. 2003) 
(Sentelle, J., dissenting) (arguing against the application of the Commerce 
Clause to the intrastate taking of non-commercial species); id. at 1160 (Roberts, 
J., dissenting) (stating that the majority’s denial of a rehearing en banc allows a 
broadening of the Commerce Clause which conflicts with Lopez and Morrison). 
 203. See generally Hudson, supra note 192. 
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their timber holdings, resulting in smaller private forest 
properties that are “subject to new dynamic forces that encourage 
parcelization and fragmentation.”204 This transition has been 
described as “the most substantial transition in forest ownership 
of the last century,” as industry divested nearly three-quarters of 
its forest holdings.205 Most of this forestland was purchased by 
timber investment management organizations (TIMOs) and, 
more importantly for this Article, real estate investment trusts 
(REITs). These REITs typically do not have a primary interest in 
the commodity aspect of the timber but rather are interested in 
the commercial value and use of the land upon which the timber 
exists for commercial, residential, or industrial development—the 
timber is merely incidental and ancillary to property ownership. 
Indeed, REITs not only represent a voting block whose interests 
are diametrically opposed to high forest management and 
preservation standards, but their ownership of forest resources 
exacerbates the concerns regarding urbanization and reduction of 
forest cover over the next fifty years.206 The U.S. Forest Service 
has highlighted the truism that “[p]rivate owners continue to 
control forest futures” in the southeastern United States.207 
As a result, any federal regulation of timber resources owned 
by REITs, and meant to curb the projected loss of 13% of 
southeastern forests over the next fifty years, would not be aimed 
at a commodity market that is a clear case of interstate commerce 
but rather at land use planning meant to preserve a resource that 
would otherwise be appropriated by economic or commercial land 
development activities.  In other words, over the last two decades 
significant forest resources shifted from an area that, while still 
influenced by dualistic notions, lent itself to more robust 
Commerce Clause arguments for overlapping and dynamic 
jurisdictional regulatory authority at all levels of government. 
Those resources shifted into a sphere of constitutional 
understanding—direct land use planning—where currently 
notions of dual federalism remain even stronger and federal input 
is even more certain to be unwelcome, both politically and legally. 
 204. WEAR & GREIS, supra note 5, at 58. 
 205. Id. at 60–62.  
 206. Id. at 60. 
 207. Id. at 4–5. 
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As noted in the conclusion of this Article, there are good 
arguments that even these land development activities 
substantially affect interstate commerce enough to pass 
constitutional muster. Even so, such a direct clash of federal 
constitutional authority and areas of traditional, exclusive state 
regulatory control has yet to occur. Demonstrating the 
arbitrariness that often pervades governance of environmental 
resources, while the recognized importance of the forest resource 
has shifted in the direction of needing a nationwide policy to 
utilize forests to combat climate change and to capture other 
forest values, the constitutional justification supporting dynamic 
regulation of the resource has arguably shifted in the opposite 
direction, making federal utilization of subnational forests for 
climate mitigation policies even more difficult. 
To summarize, there are at least two ways in which we might 
categorize subnational forests: (1) those forest resources being 
managed as timber and sent into commercial markets and 
(2) those forest resources owned by property owners whose 
primary focus is not timber production, but who may maintain a 
goal of transitioning forests to other developed uses. Neither 
category is currently reached by federal regulatory inputs into 
forest standards, but the constitutional and political case for 
dynamic regulatory approaches is potentially easier for the 
former. The latter, on the other hand, might be more problematic 
as direct forest preservation more clearly falls into a category 
historically considered a traditional state and local government 
regulatory role under the dual federalism paradigm—an ironic 
situation considering that keeping forests forested, rather than 
converted to agricultural, industrial, commercial, residential or 
other urban development, is more critical to combating climate 
change and other environmental ills than is ensuring that timber 
operations meet certain basic standards. As a result, any legal 
arguments addressing the constitutional validity of federal 
legislation aimed at subnational forests will need to tackle both 
the “timber as commodity” and “timber as ancillary to property 
ownership” questions. Then—hopefully—policy makers at all 
levels of government would feel justified in engaging in the 
regulatory process to set forest standards ranging from the most 
basic, timber extraction-focused standards to more stringent, 
forest-preservation standards. 
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IV. Federalism and U.S. Forest Policy in Context: How History 
Informs the Path Forward 
This Article’s current call for increased dynamism in U.S. 
forest policy is not without precedent. An important historical 
context, largely overlooked in the literature, informs the 
normative arguments made in this Article and demonstrates that 
the United States has been very close to implementing a dynamic 
federalism approach to U.S. forest policy in the past. Importantly, 
and ironically, the United States almost did so due to threats 
facing southern forests. As discussed below, the primary 
distinction between the past near miss with dynamism and the 
present is the type of threat facing the forest—then it was fire, 
now it is urbanization and climate change. This Part recounts 
this historical context through the scholarship of Professor 
William Boyd, who undertook a fascinating review of the history 
of southern forestry since the turn of the twentieth century.208 
The history of privately owned southern forests is one that 
seems to have largely been forgotten, but it is a history that 
demonstrates a much greater interest by both the federal 
government and southern state governments in southern forest 
management than seen at the present time. After the Civil War, 
the southern states exploited their forests almost out of existence, 
leading to “probably the most rapid and reckless destruction of 
forests known to history” and what William Faulkner called “the 
slain wood.”209  
In contrast to the seemingly limited federal administrative or 
congressional interest in southern private forests today, a series 
of federal studies and inquiries into the implications of southern 
deforestation took place at the beginning of the twentieth 
century. In 1919, Gifford Pinchot, the “father” of the U.S. Forest 
Service, authored a report predicting a timber shortage in the 
nation, which prompted the U.S. Forest Service, in the “Capper 
Report,”210 to assess the potential role of the federal government 
 208. William Boyd, The Forest is the Future? Industrial Forestry and the 
Southern Pulp and Paper Complex, in THE SECOND WAVE: SOUTHERN 
INDUSTRIALIZATION FROM THE 1940S TO THE 1970S 168 (Philip Scranton ed., 2001). 
 209. Id. at 168 nn.25–26. 
 210. Capper–Volstead Act, Pub. L. No. 67-146, ch. 57, 42 Stat. 388 (1922) 
(codified as amended in 7 U.S.C. §§ 291, 292). 
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in regulating private forest management.211 The severity of the 
timber supply problem in the South was made clear when the 
Capper Report concluded that the South would need to import 
timber to sustain timber supply.212 This is despite the fact that in 
1911 the U.S. Congress passed the Weeks Law213 to provide 
funding to state agencies to curb forest destruction due to 
widespread fires. Later, the Clarke–McNary Act of 1924214 
attempted to increase these fire protection efforts even further. 
Both the Capper Report and the Clark–McNary Act investigated 
state and local forest taxation practices that were encouraging 
premature cutting of what little timber was not destroyed by 
fire.215 This prompted southern states to adopt special tax 
provisions aimed at promoting industrial forestry.216 In 1928, the 
McSweeny–McNary Forest Research Act217 authorized the first 
nationwide forest survey, which was seen as a necessary step 
before policy changes could facilitate investment in southern 
forests.218 Two decades later, the Forest Pest Control Act of 
1947219 represented federal and state cooperation to resolve pest 
and disease problems.220  
The early twentieth century federal interest in state and 
private forest management represented a debate that “centered 
on whether the federal government should regulate private 
forestry directly or assist state governments and industry 
 211. Tom Paulu, Gifford Pinchot was Father of U.S. Forest Service, THE 
DAILY NEWS ONLINE (June 27, 2008, 12:00 AM), http://tdn.com/lifestyles/gifford-
pinchot-was-father-of-u-s-forest-service/article_bba03335-149a-5611-bbe4-392d0 
ac62eec.html (last visited Sept. 24, 2014) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). 
 212. Boyd, supra note 208, at 174–75. 
 213. Weeks Act, Pub. L. No. 61-435, ch. 186, 36 Stat. 961 (1911) (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C.). 
 214. Clarke–McNary Act, Pub. L. No. 68-270, ch. 348, 43 Stat. 653 (1924) 
(codified as amended in 16 U.S.C. §§ 568 to 570). 
 215. Boyd, supra note 208, at 183–84. 
 216. Id. at 185. 
 217. McSweeney–McNary Forest Research Act, ch. 678, 45 Stat. 699 (1928) 
(codified as amended in 16 U.S.C. § 581). 
 218. Boyd, supra note 208, at 176. 
 219. Forest Pest Control Act, ch. 141, 61 Stat. 177 (1947) (codified as 
amended in 42 U.S.C. §§ 594-1, 594-1 note, 594-2 to 594-5). 
 220. Boyd, supra note 208, at 181. 
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through cooperative institutions and programs”—a debate which 
“stemmed from the growing concern among professional foresters 
and political leaders over the extent of forest destruction in the 
U.S. during the 1910s and 1920s.”221 In large part the debate over 
whether federal prescriptive regulation was necessary was 
founded upon the fact that the high degree of assistance provided 
by federal and state governments was not succeeding in creating 
responsible forest management practices on private lands.222 One 
government report even recommended a massive federal 
acquisition of private forests in the amount of 224 million acres—
an amount ten million acres greater than the entire acreage of 
southeastern forests today.223 The report recommended this 
drastic step as a mechanism for “ensuring that the nation’s 
timberlands would be properly managed.”224  
These drastic steps were never taken, however, and 
ultimately federal assistance of forestry in the South won out 
over federal prescriptive regulation. Professor Boyd describes the 
transformation of southern forests from veritable wasteland after 
the Civil War to one of the most productive commodity forests on 
the earth as involving three phases: (1) rationalization, 
(2) regeneration, and (3) intensification.225 
Rationalization involved making the southern forests worthy 
of investment. The primary problem stifling investment was fire, 
with Gifford Pinchot declaring that “[u]nless fires are checked, 
forestry in the Southern pineries will never appeal to men of good 
business sense.”226 The fire problem was so widespread that the 
desire to invest in southern forests was chilled. A 1930s survey 
found that fires occurred on more than three-quarters of the state 
of Georgia’s total forest area, which is quite unimaginable today. 
In fact, the South led the nation in both the frequency and 
acreage burned by forest fires, accounting for 85% of all forest 
fires in the country in the 1920s and 1930s—even though the 
 221. Id. at 187. 
 222. Id. 
 223. SOCIETY OF AMERICAN FORESTERS, The State of America’s Forest 61–63 
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 224. Boyd, supra note 208, at 187. 
 225. Id. at 171–72. 
 226. Id. at 176. 
                                                                                                     
1706 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1643 (2014) 
south only contained around one-third of the nation’s total forest 
area.227 Nearly half of these fires resulted due to the “deep-seated 
cultural practice of annual woods-burning” that was “part of the 
very fabric of rural life in the South.”228 To achieve 
rationalization, the McSweeny–McNary Forest Research Act 
survey was critical in solving the fire problem and “represented a 
very important intervention in the emerging discourse on forestry 
practices in the South, particularly in the context of fire 
control.”229 In the same way, the Forest Pest Control Act of 1947 
represented federal and state cooperation to resolve the insect 
and disease problems within southern forests and the Capper 
Report and Clark–McNary Act’s emphasis on state taxation 
practices helped resolve the premature cutting of timber not 
destroyed by fire.230  
The next phase that transformed southern forests, 
regeneration, involved the reforestation and afforestation of 
degraded forest and agricultural lands. Once the fire, pest, and 
tax problems were addressed during the rationalization phase, 
reforestation efforts took place in full force, primarily led by large 
industrial timber operators. These efforts were bolstered by 
federal support in the Clark–McNary Act of 1924, providing 
funding to states and private property owners for forest planting 
on private lands231 and “usher[ing] in an era of cooperation 
between the federal government, state governments, and private 
actors on matters of forest policy and management.”232 
Regeneration indeed occurred apace, bolstered by incentive-based 
programs like the 1956 Soil Bank Act,233 which resulted in the 
conversion of more than 2 million acres of cropland into timber 
plantations between 1956 and 1960.234 The Conservation Reserve 
Program of the 1980s had the same effect.235 Between 1948 and 
 227. Id. at 178. 
 228. Id. 
 229. Id. at 177. 
 230. Id. at 181. 
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1968 nearly 10 million acres of southern agricultural land was 
converted to timberland,236 and by the late 1980s regeneration of 
forests by public and industrial private and nonindustrial private 
landowners added an additional 2.5 million acres.237 
The third phase, intensification, involved the taking of newly 
regenerated forestlands and making them even more productive 
through scientific advances, such as through the use of 
genetically superior trees that were more pest resistant and had 
quicker growth rates. The avid conservationist Aldo Leopold even 
criticized the forest industry for assuming that all trees were 
equal and for ignoring the study of tree genetics to drive forest 
operations.238 
The three phases of rationalization, regeneration, and 
intensification ultimately turned the southeastern forest into the 
“wood basket of the world.”239 Beginning in the 1930s, the forest 
products industry began a dramatic shift to southern forests, 
which Thomas Clark calls the “grand march south.”240 In only 
twenty years, the South shifted from a 15% share of the total 
woodpulp capacity in the United States to a 55% share. By 1990, 
this share had grown to 71%.241  
The story of southeastern forests in the early twentieth 
Century is in large part about whether federalism should be 
restructured to become more dynamic to forestall threats to U.S. 
forest resources. President Roosevelt and others contemplated 
that the federal government had the constitutional authority to 
act to curb forest destruction in the South and called for federal 
action to do so. Perhaps the closest the federal government came 
to prescriptive regulation of private forestry is Article X of the 
Lumber Code of the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933 
(NIRA).242 This provision aimed to “commit[] the lumber industry 
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to principles of conservation and sustained yield.”243 The 
Supreme Court ultimately found the entire statute 
unconstitutional on various grounds,244 and in part found that 
“where  the  effect  of  intrastate transactions  upon  interstate  
commerce  is  merely  indirect, such transactions remain within 
the domain of state power.”245 It is important to note, however, 
that this case was during a period of narrow Commerce Clause 
interpretation, and just before the 1937–1995 period where the 
Supreme Court failed to strike down one statute as beyond 
Congress’s Commerce Clause authority.246 President Roosevelt, 
however, did not give up on prescriptive federal involvement with 
southern forest policy so easily. As William Boyd describes, 
President Roosevelt sought to address the “forest problem,” 
which, in the words of Roosevelt: 
is a matter of vital national concern, and some way must be 
found to make forest lands and forest resources contribute 
their full share to the social and economic structures of this 
country, and to the security and stability of all our people.” 
Evoking images of “denuded” watersheds and “crippled” forest 
communities “still being left desolate and forlorn,” Roosevelt 
urged the Congress to study the problem and propose 
legislation that would include “such public regulatory controls 
as will adequately protect private as well as the broad public 
interests in all forest lands.”247 
Going further, Roosevelt noted that “most of the States, 
communities, and private companies have, on the whole, 
accomplished little to retard or check the continuing process of 
using up our forest resources without replacement . . . it seems 
obviously necessary to fall back on the last defensive line—
Federal leadership and Federal Action.”248 Roosevelt was in fact 
articulating a key principle of dynamic federalism, whereby the 
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federal government may act as a fail-safe when subnational 
governments are unable to coordinate to avoid economically and 
environmentally destructive consequences for the nation as a 
whole.249 In an action that is hard to imagine today, an Alabama 
Senator, John Bankhead, launched an investigation into the 
problems highlighted by Roosevelt, and his committee “concluded 
that the management of commercial forest land under private 
ownership represented the crux of the so-called forest 
problem.”250 Southern politicians today seem more interested in 
promoting the urbanization of southern forestlands to gain the 
economic benefits of development in their jurisdictions rather 
than dealing with the threats to southern forests.251 
The mere threat of federal regulation, however, played a role 
in changing the management of southern forests, which may be 
an instructive cue for how to achieve more dynamic forest policies 
today. Pulp and paper firms largely moved toward a system of 
conservation, regeneration, and minimum standards for forest 
protection, and even encouraged nonindustrial private 
landowners to do the same.252 In 1937, representatives of the pulp 
and paper industry crafted the “Statement of Conservation Policy 
of the Southern Pine Pulpwood Industry,” which committed the 
industry to promote selective cutting, forest restoration, and fire 
protection.253 Indeed, the Southern Pulpwood Conservation 
Association forged a motto of “[c]ut wisely, prevent fires, and 
grow more trees for a better South,” which “symbolized the extent 
to which forest protection and forest regeneration were being 
framed in the language of moral duty.”254  
In the end, the route of federal assistance was chosen over 
federal regulation, largely because the threat of federal 
regulation and assistance efforts regarding fire, insects, and 
perverse tax incentives caused an incredibly quick turnaround for 
southern forests, leading to rapid reforestation. It seems that this 
was enough to satisfy Roosevelt and others, who through a 
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skeptical lens may not have been as concerned with 
environmental degradation of southern forests as with the 
devastating economic impacts that a degraded southern forest 
would have on the nation. Alabama Senator Bankhead’s 
committee report “effectively marked the end of the push for 
federal regulation.”255 
With this context as a backdrop, we can see that while 
history does not repeat itself, it certainly does rhyme, as climate 
change and urbanization of the South may be characterized as 
the new fire problem. As a result, a new push for federal 
minimum forest standards is needed, combined with dynamic 
action by state and local governments. As Professor Boyd 
described, any institutional program to address the fire problem 
in the early twentieth century would necessarily have been 
crafted through “cooperation between state and federal agencies, 
the forest products industry, and private landowners. Because 
fire did not respect political or administrative boundaries, 
moreover, a successful strategy required a regional focus. Fire 
control, to put it crudely, represented a collective action problem 
that demanded new forms of coordination.”256 The same may be 
said for urbanization and deforestation in the South and its 
climate change implications.  
Importantly, however, the effects of the voluntary assistance 
provided to the South in regenerating southern forests in the 
early twentieth Century are distinguishable from any voluntary 
federal or state programs today. The shift in the resource base 
toward reforestation last century had strong economic drivers—to 
tap southern forests’ ability to provide economic growth to the 
nation as a whole. Economic drivers today are running in the 
opposite direction. As the forest industry has shifted overseas and 
divested their landholdings, the nation loses not only industrial 
focus on keeping forests forested but also industry’s influence on 
nonindustrial landowners to do the same. The markets for forest 
products dry up when the big players move out, leaving smaller 
players with incentives to convert forests to other uses or to sell 
to others who will do the same, such as REITs. The gains made in 
reforestation during the first push for federal regulation of 
 255. Id. at 213 n.99. 
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private forests are now set to be undone, not only in the carbon 
storage context but also regarding biodiversity, water quality, 
and many other areas where forests provide critical services.  
So, again, there are two things to be learned through 
comparing the historical context of southern forestry with today’s 
state of affairs—namely that the current threats to the southern 
forest resources come from both within the forest sector and from 
without. From within the forest sector we have learned that 
monoculture plantations are more vulnerable to forest pathogens, 
reduce species diversity and habitat, and the shift of industry 
overseas have reduced profitability in the region, hence the 
dumping of holdings by major industrial players in the region.257 
So at a first level the nation needs to move toward dynamic 
federalism providing more holistic forest management 
standards—standards that capture a wider range of ecosystem-
centric forest values as represented in Figure 1, above. From 
without—and arguably the more urgent threat—southern forests 
face pressure from urbanization and climate change impacts. 
Thus, we need to move to forest policy dynamism that simply 
keeps forests forested for their carbon sink potential if nothing 
else. Of course, co-benefits of preserving forests in the face of 
rapid urbanization will be biodiversity, water quality, and other 
beneficial environmental protections. 
V. Conclusion: Toward a Dynamic Federalism Formula to Protect 
Dynamic Resources 
To remedy a highly fragmented U.S. forest policy, lawmakers 
and scholars should move beyond a myopic focus on federal 
forests. Two-thirds of the nation’s forests are in the hands of 
subnational entities, either state and local governments or 
private property owners. These entities maintain virtually 
exclusive management control over the nation’s forests due to a 
historical inertia of legal and political dual federalist conceptions 
of forest regulation. To forestall the threats facing forests and the 
society that depends upon them in the coming decades—
especially climate change—the nation needs to move toward 
 257. Id. at 202. 
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dynamic federalism in the forest arena. This would call for 
cooperative regulatory action at all scales of governance. While 
this Article laid a descriptive foundation for the current state of 
U.S. forest policy and made the normative argument that the 
nation should move toward dynamic federalism, this Article’s 
companion piece will detail how the nation should do so—from 
the constitutional arguments for federal inputs into subnational 
forest policy to the legislative structure of such efforts. 
This Article highlighted that two separate categories of forest 
standards need political attention: (1) those related to industrial 
extraction of forest products; and (2) those related to land uses 
that would replace forests with development. Recent research 
establishes a unified theory for assessing the validity of 
congressional authority to regulate each of these categories, 
utilizing commons analysis to do so.258 This analysis will form the 
foundational constitutional arguments for this Article’s 
companion piece. Commons analysis demonstrates that the 
federal government maintains constitutional authority to 
regulate two categories of environmental resources that have 
substantial effects on interstate commerce: (1) natural resources 
contained on land (wetlands, forests, endangered species, or other 
natural capital) that are appropriated by economic development 
(commercial, housing, industrial, agricultural, etc.), and 
(2) resources appropriated by individuals and tied to an interstate 
market (wheat, marijuana, or other natural capital 
commodities).259 Timber commodities clearly fall into this latter 
category. Though it seems clear that timber production on private 
lands can be constitutionally regulated by the federal government 
under this second category, federal preservation of forests 
threatened by urbanization—such as the forests in the 
Southeast—may be constitutionally viable under the first 
category. Any time commercial development replaces forest 
resources, there is an appropriator of the resource tied to 
interstate markets (the developer) and a resource that is being 
appropriated (the forest). These are the constituent components 
of a commons, and it is the act of “appropriation” by the developer 
of the forest resource that substantially affects interstate 
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commerce and that may be aggregated to give the federal 
government constitutional authority over resource 
management.260 
Either way, if the federal government sought input into 
subnational forest policy pursuant to its Commerce Clause power, 
there are strong arguments that it may do so—either to provide 
standards for timber production or to preserve forests and their 
corresponding carbon sequestration and climate change 
mitigation values in the face of threatening urbanization.  
Ultimately, the constitutionality of federal subnational forest 
management legislation has yet to be tested by the U.S. Congress 
or within U.S. courts—despite the fact that there are good 
arguments supporting its legitimacy.261 
To be clear, this Article and its companion piece are not 
arguing for a massive “over-centralization” of forest policy. 
Clearly, decentralized forest policy making provides many 
well-recognized benefits.262 Achieving these benefits is one of the 
driving purposes behind establishing a federal form of 
government in the first instance,263 and decentralized inputs are 
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important components of effective resource governance on local, 
national, and global scales. Nonetheless, given the increased 
recognition of the key role of forests in regulating global 
atmospheric carbon, maintaining federal regulatory authority in 
addition to subnational authority provides a mechanism to 
course-correct a trend of “over-decentralization” of forest 
management policy, whereby disaggregated state and local forest 
policies fail to coordinate in a way that facilitates holistic and 
consequential forest conservation and climate change 
responses.264 In this way, nations like the United States can 
“strike a balance between centralized planning and minimum 
standards at the federal level and decentralized implementation, 
harnessing of local information and expertise, and other benefits 
at the subnational level.”265 Indeed, a well-recognized condition of 
successful forest governance in federal systems is “effective and 
balanced distribution of forest related responsibilities and 
authority among levels of government,”266 because “[c]ertain 
forest management decisions are better made at the subnational, 
or even local levels of government, while others may best be 
retained at a central level.”267 
It is time that U.S. forest policy followed suit with the 
regulation of other natural resources and became more dynamic. 
This Article is an initial attempt to develop a framework for how 
it may do so. Without a shift away from archaic notions of dual 
federalism in the forest sector, it will not only be this nation’s 
forests at stake but also its water, biodiversity, coastline, fishery, 
and air quality resources. Perhaps even more importantly, given 
the key role of forests in regulating climate and the persuasive 
role the United States might play in forestalling developing world 
deforestation, failure of the United States to solve its own forest 
problem in this century will have global ramifications for 
centuries to come. 
(Carol J. Pierce Colfer & Doris Capistrano eds., 2005). 
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